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THE LAW OF INTIMATE WORK
Naomi Schoenbaum*
Abstract: This Article introduces the concept of intimate work—intimate services
provided by paid workers to a range of consumers—and seeks to unify its treatment in law.
The concept explains multiple exceptions to work law that have previously been viewed as
random and even contradictory. From the daycare worker to the divorce lawyer, the nurse to
the hairstylist, intimate work introduces an intimate party—the consumer—into the arm’slength employer-employee dyad on which work law is premised. This disruption leads to
limited enforcement of non-compete agreements, the waiver or imposition of fiduciary duties,
and exceptions to wage-and-hour and antidiscrimination law, among other consequences.
The current ad hoc approach to intimate work does harm. Law’s separate regulation of
intimacy and work fails to recognize the special value and vulnerability generated when the
two overlap. At times, law protects only a narrow subset of intimate work, as the existing
approach to non-compete agreements reveals. At other times, law gets intimate work
backward, taking away protection at precisely the moment more protection is needed, as is
the case with antidiscrimination law. The resulting law permits employers to promote
discrimination in the formation of intimate work bonds, to discipline intimate workers who
act to benefit consumers, to expose intimate workers and consumers to the abuse of personal
information, and to break valuable intimate work bonds with impunity. These harms are only
magnified with the rise of intimate work.
This Article proposes a unified law of intimate work sensitive to the value and
vulnerability it generates. This law has implications for a wide swath of doctrines, and for
gender equality, as women are especially harmed by the failure to value intimate work. Much
of this law can be achieved by analogical adaptation of time-proven doctrines. For example,
law should no longer ignore lost intimate work bonds as an injury when evaluating noncompete agreements or crafting remedies for termination. In other situations, new approaches
are needed, such as limits on employers’ ability to cultivate discriminatory consumer
preferences. In the end, this new law of intimate work is designed to protect intimate workers
and consumers while valuing relationships that are central to everyday life.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider the following cases. A hospital seeking to hire a labor and
delivery nurse may consider only women for the position, although such
discrimination would be unlawful in hiring almost all other workers.1 A
home health aide hired to provide companionship to an elderly client
need not be paid minimum wage or overtime, although an employer
would violate wage-and-hour law by failing to pay almost any other
worker.2 A lawyer or therapist owes fiduciary obligations to her clients,
although most other workers are held only to arm’s-length contractual
obligations to their clients.3 A non-compete agreement restricting a
doctor from ongoing relationships with patients is unenforceable,
although a court would not hesitate to enforce the same agreement as
applied to an accountant, a hairstylist, or most any other worker.4
This Article explains and unifies these exceptional cases by
introducing the concept of intimate work. Intimate work involves the
paid provision of services entailing intimacy to a range of consumers.
The examples above reveal that law often singles out intimate work for
special treatment, creating a de facto law of intimate work. To appreciate
the breadth of this phenomenon, one need look no further than two of the
most watched Supreme Court cases last term. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc.’s5 recognition of employers’ religious freedom may lead to
special treatment for intimate work under antidiscrimination law,
permitting wedding vendors, for example, to refuse service to gay
couples.6 And Harris v. Quinn’s7 holding that home healthcare providers
are the lone public employees exempt from union dues sets intimate
1. See Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated as moot, 671
F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982) (dismissing case on mootness grounds because the plaintiff found work
with another employer, which mooted all of his requested relief).
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (2012) (exempting workers who provide companionship to the
elderly from wage-and-hour protections). In 2013, the Department of Labor issued regulations that
would narrow this exemption. The D.C. Circuit reversed the invalidation of both rules, but it is too
soon to tell whether any further review will unsettle this outcome. See infra note 181 for further
discussion of these rules.
3. See, e.g., Horne v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 829–30 (Ala. 1973) (applying fiduciary duties to
doctor vis-à-vis patient); Clancy v. State Bar, 454 P.2d 329, 333 (Cal. 1969) (en banc) (per curiam)
(applying fiduciary duties to attorney vis-à-vis client).
4. See, e.g., Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1286 (Ariz. 1999) (invalidating
non-compete agreement for interfering with the doctor-patient relationship); Williams v. Hobbs, 460
N.E.2d 287, 290 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (same).
5. 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
6. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Hobby Lobby Is Only the Beginning, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2014, at A25.
7. 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
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work apart under labor law.8 Despite the special place of intimate work
throughout a range of laws, no scholar has yet synthesized the law of
intimate work or assessed its effectiveness.9
By developing the category of intimate work as a descriptive matter,
this Article brings the unique features of intimate work, and its current
regulation, into full view. Normatively, the Article reveals the
incoherence of the existing law of intimate work. Across a wide swath of
doctrines—from antidiscrimination law, to wage-and-hour law, to
retaliation protections, to fiduciary law, to non-compete agreements, to
the misappropriation of trade secrets, to remedies for unlawful
termination—law has not done enough to recognize the unique
circumstances of intimate work. This Article argues for a new unified
field of intimate work law to protect the circumstances under which
intimate workers labor and the public as consumers receive critical
services.
Bringing together intimacy and work joins two spheres that law tends
to consider separate.10 Yet, in everyday life, intimacy and work are
anything but distinct. Workers—doctors, nurses, divorce lawyers,
hairstylists, and bartenders—have long engaged in the intimate aspects
of life. More recently, intimate work is on the rise, as workers have come
to provide services that were once the hallmark of family life.11 Dating
counselors guide us in how to pick the right partners; wedding planners
instruct us in how to create memories; lactation consultants teach us how
to breastfeed; and funeral directors arrange our deaths.12 It is now
possible to rent a worker to serve as a mom, husband, grandma, grandpa,
or friend.13
8. Id. at 2644.
9. Scholars have addressed individual examples of intimate work, but have not explored the
category as a unified field in experience or law. See Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love,
91 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 72–79 (1996) (discussing work law exceptions for domestic care workers);
Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex
Discrimination, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 147, 156 (2004) (discussing the bona fide occupational
qualification to antidiscrimination law as applied to some intimate work).
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See Timothy Noah, Labor of Love: The Enforced Happiness of Pret A Manger, NEW
REPUBLIC (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112204/pret-manger-whencorporations-enforce-happiness.
12. See, e.g., ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE OUTSOURCED SELF: INTIMATE LIFE IN MARKET
TIMES 9–17 (2012).
13. See, e.g., RENT A MOM INC., http://www.rentamominc.com (last visited Aug. 17, 2015) (“The
Company with a Heart for Families”); RENT A HUSBAND, http://www.rentahusband.com (last visited
Aug. 17, 2015) (promising a “handyman . . . in a good mood . . . [e]ven if those nagging household
chores have put you in a bad one”); RENT A GRANDMA, http://rentagrandma.com (last visited Aug.
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While the varieties of intimate work differ, they are united by the
presence of a consumer seeking and receiving intimacy. The intimacy
consumer disrupts the arm’s-length employer-employee dyad that law, in
contrast to social science, assumes is at the heart of all employment
relationships.14 The close relationship between the worker and consumer
generates value as a source of personal and professional support for both
consumers and workers, but also generates substantial vulnerability.15
Together, this value and vulnerability place participants in the intimate
work relationship in a unique position that calls for tailored regulation.
But law’s separate regulation of intimacy and work creates a blind spot
to a social reality—like intimate work—that combines the two. Law thus
fails to protect the value and guard against the vulnerability of intimate
work. This legal shortcoming has consequences for the promise of work
as a site of equality, for the harms that can flow from work, and for the
stability of critical relationships.
First, intimate work raises vulnerability to discrimination. The close
relationships formed by intimate work are valuable as a site for
combatting bias, but these relationships also introduce another party into
the employment relationship—the consumer—who can discriminate
against the worker and against whom the worker can discriminate.16
Rather than using intimate work to promote equality, law exempts
certain intimate workers from protection.17 For other intimate workers
and consumers, law fails to intervene when employers reinforce
discriminatory preferences by, for example, accommodating consumers’

8, 2015); RENT A GRANDPA, http://rentagrandpa.com (last visited Aug. 8, 2015); RENT A FRIEND,
https://rentafriend.com/beafriend (last visited Aug. 17, 2015) (“Get paid to be a friend!”).
14. Compare Robin Leidner, Emotional Labor in Service Work, 561 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 81 (1999) (highlighting the relationship between the worker and the consumer as critical to
the work experience), and Brian Uzzi, The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the
Economic Performance of Organizations: The Network Effect, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 674, 677 (1996)
(highlighting the relationship between the worker and the consumer as essential to developing trust
between the consumer and the firm), and Amy S. Wharton, The Sociology of Emotional Labor, 35
ANN. REV. SOC. 147, 160 (2009) (same), with MARION G. CRAIN ET AL., WORK LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 3 (2d ed. 2010) (describing the premise of work law as the employer-employee
relationship), and MARK ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW, CASES AND
MATERIALS 3 (7th ed. 2011) (defining the subject of work law as the regulation of the employeremployee relationship).
15. See infra Part I.B.2.
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012) (“[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of . . . religion, sex, or national origin in
those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification . . . .”).
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preferences (e.g., a request for a female gynecologist),18 and advertising
workers’ preferences (e.g., a photographer indicating her opposition to
gay marriage).19
Second, there is the vulnerability to sacrifice. Intimate workers’
willingness to act altruistically on behalf of consumers generates value,
but also means that they risk work-related rewards—including their
jobs—to benefit consumers.20 Rather than protecting the value that
altruism generates, law again takes away protection. Even though
altruism means intimate workers may do more work for consumers,
certain intimate workers are exempt from law that guarantees payment
for these efforts.21 And even though intimate workers are more likely to
risk retaliation by advocating on behalf of consumers, law affords them
no additional retaliation protection, and in practice provides less.22
Third, there is the vulnerability to exposure. Intimate relationships
lead to value-generating closeness and sharing, but also leave workers
and consumers vulnerable to having sensitive information revealed and
misused, and to emotional harm.23 Law recognizes this value and the
attendant vulnerability too narrowly. Some intimate workers owe
fiduciary duties to their consumers to protect them from this type of
exposure.24 But more often, these duties do not extend to intimate
workers,25 nor do they run from consumers to intimate workers, even
though the latter reveal personal information and may be just as exposed.
No other law protects against the emotional harm to which intimate
workers and consumers are vulnerable.
18. See Veleanu v. Beth Isr. Med. Ctr., No. 98 Civ. 7455, 2000 WL 1400965, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 25, 2000) (holding that satisfying patient’s request for female gynecologist does not constitute
unlawful discrimination).
19. See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013) (holding that wedding
photographer who refuses service to gay couple violates antidiscrimination law but stating that
employer could post a sign indicating its disapproval of same-sex marriage instead).
20. See infra Part II.C.
21. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (2012) (exempting babysitters and companions for the elderly
from overtime and minimum wage); id. § 213(b)(21) (exempting live-in domestic workers from
overtime).
22. See, e.g., Five Star Transp., Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. 42 (2007) (refusal to hire school bus drivers
who complained about safety concerns for children to predecessor employer); Orchard Park Health
Care Ctr., Inc., 341 N.L.R.B. 642, 644 (2004) (suspension and discharge of nursing home
employees who complained about poor client conditions).
23. See infra Part II.D.
24. See, e.g., Clancy v. State Bar, 454 P.2d 329, 333 (Cal. 1969) (attorney-client); Petrillo v.
Syntex Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 961 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (doctor-patient).
25. See, e.g., Grow v. Ind. Retired Teachers Cmty., 271 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971)
(retirement home worker-resident).
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Finally, there is the vulnerability to lost investments. Despite the
unique value the intimate relationship produces, workers and consumers
are vulnerable to losing this value when their relationships rupture.26 The
law of non-compete agreements recognizes the lost value of these
ruptured relationships for a narrow subset of workers—doctors and
lawyers—but not for the whole category of intimate work.27 Other law
that regulates the rupture of intimate work ties—such as the duty of
loyalty, trade secrets, and unemployment insurance—fails to take
account of these ruptured relationships, leaving intimate workers and
their consumers perpetually vulnerable to losing investments in these
bonds.28
This Article calls for a comprehensive field of intimate work law that
protects the value and remedies the vulnerability of intimate work.
Extending critiques of the law’s special treatment of intimacy outside of
work,29 this Article theorizes how a law that recognizes intimate work
would better reflect and protect the value that intimacy and work bring to
our lives. A law reconfigured to recognize intimate work would also
bring significant benefits for gender equality, as women bear the
disproportionate burden of the failure to value intimate work.30 Beyond
these benefits, law is needed because private ordering is inadequate in
the intimate work context.
A new law of intimate work would recognize intimate work in two
recognize the relevance of intimate work under current doctrine. In
deciding the enforceability of a non-compete agreement, for example,
courts must consider hardship to the worker and injury to the public,31
yet courts do not take into account the loss of intimate work
26. See infra Part II.E.
27. See, e.g., Zona Corp. v. McKinnon, No. PLCV201100247, 2011 WL 1663094 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Mar. 14, 2011) (hairstylist); Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531 (Wyo. 1993)
(veterinarian).
28. See infra Part II.E.2–.4.
29. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of
Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307 (2009) (critiquing special discrimination rules for the
family); Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491 (2005)
(critiquing special economic exchange rules for the family); Melissa Murray, The Networked
Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385
(2008) (critiquing special support rules for the domestic family); Laura Rosenbury, Friends with
Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2007) (same); Silbaugh, supra note 9 (critiquing special work
rules for the family). See generally Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983) (exposing and critiquing legal
separation of family and market).
30. See infra note 290 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Hopper, 861 P.2d at 539–40.
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relationships. Second, this Article proposes additional law to recognize
intimate work fully. To enhance the free formation of intimate work
bonds, for example, new law would limit employers’ reliance on identity
traits to match consumers with intimate workers.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I makes visible the social
reality of intimate work by defining intimate work, setting forth a
typology with illustrative examples, and delineating the contours of the
category. Part II describes the existing law of intimate work and what is
missing. Relying on a rich social science literature, this Part catalogues
the mismatch between the law of intimate work and the conduct of
intimate workers and consumers—and the harms that result. Part III
theorizes a new law of intimate work that would extend existing legal
protections to intimate work and develop new protections.

I.

INTIMATE WORK

Until the Industrial Revolution, intimacy and work were merged in
the household: Work was done in the home by the family, which was
also the primary site of intimacy.32 The law likewise merged these
relations within the status relations of the household: master-wife,
master-servant, and master-slave.33 With the Industrial Revolution came
a spatial separation of family and work that placed the family (and
intimacy) in the home, and paid work in the market.34 An ideology and
law of separate spheres followed. The market became the province of
work, which was marked by rationality, self-interest, and autonomy.35
The family became the province of intimacy, which was marked by
affection, altruism, and dependence.36 The law followed, with separate
law governing the family and the market.37
This divide is, of course, a false one. Workers regularly engage in
intimacy,38 and, indeed, the primary purpose of some jobs is to provide
intimate services to consumers.39 But it is not the mere ubiquity of
32. See Olsen, supra note 29, at 1499.
33. See Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 8
(2011).
34. See Olsen, supra note 29, at 1499.
35. See Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1, 10–43
(1992); Olsen, supra note 29, at 1563–70.
36. See Gavison, supra note 35, at 10–43; Olsen, supra note 29, at 1563–70.
37. See Olsen, supra note 29, at 1499.
38. See, e.g., Laura Rosenbury, Working Relationships, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 117, 130–34
(2011).
39. Consider the psychotherapist, massage therapist, nurse, or divorce lawyer, to name just a few
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intimate work that matters for legal regulation. It is the common
consequences of introducing an intimate consumer into work—the
unique value and vulnerability that it generates—that render it a category
worthy of special regulation. But law’s focus on the employer-employee
relationship to the exclusion of the relationship with the consumer means
that the law fails to protect the value, and guard against the vulnerability,
that intimate work produces.
Before turning to the shortcomings of the law’s current approach to
intimate work, this Part provides an integrated account of the
phenomenon of intimate work and what coheres it as an important
category of study for law. It begins by defining intimate work, follows
with several illustrative examples, and then differentiates the category of
intimate work from other types of work.

A.

Definition and Typology

The definition of intimate work set forth earlier—a worker providing
intimate services to a consumer—requires unpacking. The “intimate”
part of intimate work arises when interactions depend on “particularized
knowledge received, and attention provided by, at least one person—
knowledge and attention that are not widely available to third parties.”40
The knowledge is not ordinary knowledge, but knowledge of special
types of information such as “shared secrets, interpersonal rituals, bodily
information, awareness of personal vulnerability, and shared memory of
embarrassing situations.”41 Nor is the attention ordinary attention, but
attention that encompasses “such elements as terms of endearment,
bodily services, private languages, emotional support, and correction of
embarrassing defects.”42
The “work” part of intimate work means that these intimate services
are provided as part of, or adjunct to, paid market work. 43 Note that this
definition excludes intimate work in the family. Other scholars have
recognized the presence of intimate work within the family, primarily in
the form of housework and childcare.44 While intimate work in the

examples.
40. VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY 14 (2005).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 14–15.
43. Work can be paid or unpaid, part of the market or not. See Noah D. Zatz, What Welfare
Requires from Work, 54 UCLA L. REV. 373, 380–83 (2006).
44. See Silbaugh, supra note 9, at 11–13; Nancy Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571,
1574 (1996); Joan C. Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J.
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family shares some features of intimate work in the market, it remains
unpaid.45
Intimate work arises in four common categories. First, work can be
intimate because it involves body work, which I define as non-erotic
services that involve contact with or access to private information related
to the body. Body work is intimate because it requires physical exposure
to and sometimes contact with the body, the revelation of private
information about the body, or both. Examples include a doctor, nurse,
personal trainer, manicurist, massage therapist, and bikini waxer.
Second, work can be intimate because it involves care work, which I
define as support with the needs of daily living. Care work is intimate
because it requires exposure of personal, often sensitive information, and
sometimes access to or knowledge about the body. Examples include
childcare workers and home healthcare workers.
Third, work can be intimate because it involves confidences work,
which I define as work that entails access to private information. This
category of intimate work includes both workers whose job descriptions
include receiving confidences, such as a divorce lawyer or therapist, as
well as workers who as a matter of fact often receive confidences, such
as a wedding photographer or bartender. Confidences work also includes
what we might call spiritual workers, such as clergy.
Finally, work can be intimate because it entails erotic work, which I
define as work that involves the performance of erotic services. Erotic
work is intimate because it involves exposure of the body, the revelation
of private sexual information, or both. Erotic workers include sex
workers, exotic dancers, and phone sex operators.
These categories have their differences, but they all share the presence
of intimacy, whether it be in the form of body access, daily interactions
about our personal lives, conversations about private affairs, or erotic
acts. These categories also all share the feature of arising out of paid
work, whether it is the check we write to the nanny, doctor, or divorce
lawyer. In each of these situations, part of why the work has value is
because the intimate worker knows of the contours of our body, our
daily habits, the details of our marriage, or our erotic preferences.
These categories of intimate work are meant to be fluid. A single
intimate worker may perform multiple types of intimate work. For
instance, a home health aide engages in care work by organizing her
client’s apartment, in confidences work by learning about the client’s
2227, 2235–37 (1994).
45. See Silbaugh, supra note 9, at 22.
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family, and in body work by lifting the client and learning her
medications. Generally, adding forms of intimacy increases the intimacy
of the work.
Within these categories and across them, intimate work will differ in
some respects depending on the relationship between the worker and the
consumer. Intimate work typically entails intimacy—personal
information—flowing from the consumer to the intimate worker. This
unilateral intimacy suffices to render a relationship intimate.46 Private
information may also be shared by the intimate worker. Over time, the
intimate nature of the interaction in one direction often leads the intimate
worker to share personal facts about herself.47
Even when a worker provides services that are not intrinsically
intimate, the relationship between the worker and the consumer can
grow intimate over time.48 A client’s relationship with a corporate
lawyer, for example, does not require personal disclosures, but intimacy
may nonetheless arise if a personal relationship develops between the
client and the lawyer from ongoing interactions disclosing intimate
information over time.49 In fact, developing intimate relationships with
clients is one productivity strategy employed by workers in otherwise
non-intimate, client-driven businesses, and employers often encourage
the development of intimacy as a way to increase customer loyalty.50
Regardless of the category in which it falls, intimate work exists along
a spectrum of intimacy, with some intimate work relationships more
intimate than others. Intimate work may be more or less intimate
46. See ZELIZER, supra note 40, at 14–15.
47. Even when the work itself only requires intimate facts to flow in the direction of the consumer
to the worker, bilateralism tends to increase the intimacy of the work. See, e.g., CAMERON LYNNE
MACDONALD, SHADOW MOTHERS: NANNIES, AU PAIRS, AND THE MICROPOLITICS OF MOTHERING
105–42 (2010) (mothers and nannies); RACHEL SHERMAN, CLASS ACTS: SERVICE INEQUALITY AT
LUXURY HOTELS 184–97 (2007) (hotel workers and guests).
48. Stephen R. Marks, Intimacy in the Public Realm: The Case of Co-Workers, 72 SOC. FORCES
843, 847 (1994) (noting that “[n]urse/patient, doctor/patient, teacher/student, salesperson/customer
and many other service relationships may become emotionally intense” (citations omitted)).
Sociologists have long acknowledged the significant social relations that can develop between
workers and customers. See Gregory P. Stone, City Shoppers and Urban Identification:
Observations on the Social Psychology of City Life, 60 AM. J. SOC. 36 (1954).
49. See Brian Uzzi, Embeddedness in the Making of Financial Capital: How Social Relations and
Networks Benefit Firms Seeking Financing, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 481, 488 (1999).
50. See id. (documenting how workers who service clients use intimacy to gain information and
build trust and quoting a relationship manager at a bank: “On the golf course, at a ball game, or the
theater, they’ll let their guard down more often. We exchange information—not like marriage—
more like dating. I share information about me as a person. I let them see me and share with them
our company’s struggles. As I share that information, I get information back. It’s kind of a quid pro
quo.”).
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depending on the features of the relationship, including the location of
the relationship and the duration of the relationship. In terms of location,
relationships centered in the home traditionally have been associated
with the highest degree of intimacy, either because of the association
with the family, the greater access to personal information, the higher
likelihood of bilateral intimacy, or some combination of these features. 51
In terms of duration, work can be intimate in a single transaction, but
intimacy tends to grow over time.52 The spectrum of intimacy across
intimate work means that there are paradigmatic examples of intimate
work, and other examples of intimate work that are more tenuous. Any
legal response to intimate work must take this spectrum into account, as
discussed in Part III.
Before forging ahead, it is worth making explicit what the category of
intimate work does not include. First, intimate work does not include coworkers, even though co-workers can have quite intimate relationships,53
and these intimate relationships share much of the same value and
vulnerability of intimate worker-consumer relationships. There is greater
variation in the extent to which intimate co-worker relationships arise
out of work. For example, two friends may work for the same large
corporation but never work together. This requires determining in what
circumstances co-worker intimacy can be viewed as intervening in the
employer-employee relationship.54 And because intimate relationships
between co-workers are ubiquitous, intimate co-workers cannot be
meaningfully set aside as a distinct category and instead requires
assessing whether to reconsider the whole of employment law. This
project, by contrast, considers the law of intimate work that does and
should apply to a subset of workers and their consumers.55
Second, intimate work does not include circumstances where the

51. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 634 (1980)
(“[T]he privacy of the home is constitutionally protected not only because the home is seen as a
sanctuary, privileged against prying eyes, but also because it is the place where most intimate
associations are centered.”).
52. The literature distinguishes between encounters—one-time transactions—and relationships—
an ongoing series of transactions. See Barbara Gutek et al., Achieving Service Success Through
Relationships and Enhanced Encounters, 16 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 132, 133 (2002).
Relationships will tend to be more intimate, but an encounter can be, too.
53. See Rosenbury, supra note 38, at 140.
54. This doesn’t mean that the law shouldn’t intervene in the context of intimate co-workers, but
that a more robust justification for doing so, and more considered line-drawing, may be required.
55. The regulation of co-worker intimacy and the implications for work law—including both
employment law and labor law—are the subject of future work. See Naomi Schoenbaum,
Coworkers in Law (Aug. 28, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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consumer is the employer. This excludes from the analysis nannies and
home health aides directly employed by their charges, but includes those
who are employed and placed by agencies.56 The employer-intimate
worker-consumer triad coheres with the category of intimate work. The
introduction of the intimate worker-consumer relationship into the
employer-employee dyad poses challenges for the employer—for
example, what obligations the employer has to ensure the relationship
forms free of discrimination, and what rights the employer has to rupture
the relationship between the intimate worker and the consumer. As
fleshed out in the next Part, this complicates employment law, which
primarily focuses on the employer-employee relationship. When the
employer is the consumer of intimate work, however, the relationship
remains a dyad, albeit of an altered sort. These differences prompt the
need for a different legal response.57

B.

Common Consequences

This section theorizes the common consequences of intimate work
that render it a meaningful regulatory classification. While the law
typically regulates work as an arm’s-length relationship between the
employer and the employee, the hallmark of intimate work is the
introduction of another party—the consumer—with whom the worker
relates intimately. The introduction of this significant third party into the
56. See infra Part II.C.1 for a discussion of exceptions that apply to these workers. Note that some
workers who provide intimate services to consumers, for example, a divorce lawyer who owns his
own firm and is self-employed, are not employees at all. These workers fall outside the scope of this
Article, which addresses employment law’s treatment of intimate work.
57. The question of what law should apply here is taken up in other work. See Naomi
Schoenbaum, Why Families Aren’t Firms (Aug. 28, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author). These relationships more squarely raise the question of why such intimate workers cannot
opt in to at least some of the protections of family law, and the impact of their exclusion from family
law. While scholars have likened the hiring of nannies to outsourcing by firms, see Meredith
Johnson Harbach, Outsourcing Childcare, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 254 (2012); Laura Rosenbury,
Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 879–80 (2007), here the law forces outsourcing.
One theory of the firm holds that we create firms because of asymmetric investments. See Oliver
Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1762–63
(1989). If a person makes an investment in a factory that only one other person can use, the second
person can hold up the first for the joint surplus, and so they go into business together before any
investment. Intimate workers could be organized the same way—and when such services are
provided inside a family we might say they are. But the law, through limits on adoption, polygamy,
and so forth, makes bringing such work inside the family firm impossible. Because family law bars
optimal forms of organization for this intimate work, there is a need for other legal intervention.
Because the exemption recognized in Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014), see
supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text, applies to intimate workers who effectively work under the
control of the consumer, I will address this exemption in later work.
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employer-employee dyad distinguishes intimate work from other work in
ways that require different regulation.58 This section catalogues the
distinct features of intimate work, and the next Part turns to what this
means for law.
Because of the intimacy of the relationship, the protocols that govern
the relationship between the intimate worker and the consumer are less
those of market transactions and more those of personal relationships.
This leads intimate workers and consumers to act altruistically, and to
consider each others’ interests as much as, if not more than, simple
dollars and cents.59 The personal rather than transactional protocols that
govern intimate work relationships mean that these relationships provide
critical emotional, material, and productive support.
As for emotional support, work ties are pervasively referred to as
“like family.”60 As one home health aide said of her genre of work: “We
get close, very close. You are just as much a member of their family as
their children or grandchildren.”61 Indeed, outside of the family, work is
one of the most significant sources of emotional support for working
Americans.62 This emotional support is present in the full range of
intimate work, from care workers,63 to concierges at luxury hotels,64 to
retail store workers,65 to hairstylists,66 to relationship managers at

58. See infra Part II.B–.E for implications of this third-party analysis for the category of intimate
work.
59. See Rebekah Peeples Massengill, “The Money Is Just Immaterial”: Relationality on the Retail
Shop Floor, 18 RES. SOC. WORK 185, 187 (2009); Uzzi, supra note 14, at 675–82. Consider the
remarks of one intimate worker: “The money is just immaterial . . . . I guess seeing that customers
are happy and they’re leaving and people are laughing and having a good time, that is reaping all of
the benefits of just being friendly and outgoing and knowing that they are our number one priority.”
Massengill, supra, at 197–98.
60. See ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME AND
HOME BECOMES WORK 44 (1st ed. 1997); NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, THE RETAIL REVOLUTION: HOW
WAL-MART CREATED A BRAVE NEW WORLD OF BUSINESS 68, 96 (1st ed. 2009); Massengill, supra
note 59, at 196.
61. Deborah Stone, Caring by the Book, in CARE WORK: GENDER, LABOR AND THE WELFARE
STATE 89, 104–05 (Madonna Harrington Meyer ed., 2000); see also HOCHSCHILD, supra note 60, at
152–87 (describing ethnography of relationships developing in caregiving setting); ZELIZER, supra
note 40, at 163–93 (collecting studies of relationships developing in caregiving settings).
62. See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, ECONOMIC LIVES: HOW CULTURE SHAPES THE ECONOMY 242–44
(2010) (collecting studies documenting the prevalence of intimacy between workers and consumers
and the importance of these relationships).
63. See Stone, supra note 61, at 104–05.
64. See SHERMAN, supra note 47, at 106, 184–86.
65. See Massengill, supra note 59, at 197–99 (detailing how customer relationships are important
to retail workers’ meaning of work).
66. See GRANT MCCRACKEN, BIG HAIR: A JOURNEY INTO TRANSFORMATION OF SELF 186 (1995)
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garment factories67 and commercial banks.68 Intimate workers and their
consumers also provide each other material support with direct cash
assistance as well as in-kind support, such as computer equipment and
legal advice.69
Beyond emotional and material support, intimate work relationships
are critical for intimate workers’ professional success. These
relationships generate productivity by motivating intimate workers and
consumers to act altruistically and perform additional work to support
one another.70 Intimate work relationships enhance extra-role work:
discretionary behavior that is not directly or explicitly recognized by the
formal reward system, but that nonetheless promotes the effective
functioning of the organization.71
Intimacy also serves as a conduit for information that aids in work
success. On the one side, consumers may provide information about
intimate workers to others, sponsoring them and conferring legitimacy
by backing up their reputations with superiors and prospective
customers.72 On the other side, intimate workers secure additional
private information from consumers that help them provide better
service.73 These productivity benefits of intimate work mean that strong
relationships with consumers justify price premiums, reduce employee
training costs, and lower turnover, all of which lead to higher firm
profits.74 Intimate consumers also get lower interest rates on loans75 and
lower billing rates from corporate lawyers.76
(describing how hairstylists serve as sources of support to customers with personal problems,
counseling customers and allowing them to unburden their “souls,” cutting hair while also cutting
away guilt).
67. See Uzzi, supra note 14, at 677.
68. See Uzzi, supra note 49, at 488–89.
69. See ZELIZER, supra note 40, at 178–81.
70. See George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts As Partial Gift Exchange, 97 Q.J. ECON. 543, 550
(1982) (explaining how altruism leads workers to work harder than necessary not for a raise or a
promotion, but for better treatment of their coworkers); KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS
TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 95 (2005).
71. See Stone, supra note 61, at 95 (healthcare workers and patients); Uzzi, supra note 14, at 680
(factory managers and customers); Uzzi, supra note 49, at 490 (bank managers and clients).
72. See Scott E. Seibert et al., A Social Capital Theory of Career Success, 44 ACAD. MGMT. J.
219, 223–24, 232–33 (2001) (finding that sponsorship through social ties enhances career success).
73. See Uzzi, supra note 49, at 488.
74. Chi Kin Yim et al., Strengthening Customer Loyalty Through Intimacy and Passion: Roles of
Customer–Firm Affection and Customer–Staff Relationships in Services, 45 J. MARKETING RES.
741, 741 (2008).
75. See Uzzi, supra note 49, at 482, 496–98.
76. See Brian Uzzi & Ryon Lancaster, Embeddedness and Price Formation in the Corporate Law
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The work context enables intimacy to generate different forms of
support than that afforded by intimates outside of work. While family
and friends provide support that undoubtedly confers work benefits,77
intimate work relationships nonetheless offer work support in ways that
family and friends cannot. When intimacy arises at work, it primes the
altruism that intimacy generates to take on productive forms simply
because work-related support is much easier for work intimates to
provide.78 Moreover, some productive support requires information that
family and friends cannot provide.
Intimate work also provides unique support precisely because it is
commonly separated from our family lives and takes place in a more
structured form than family or other non-work intimacy. This means that
work offers the riches of intimacy—pleasure, playfulness, humor,
affection, and even flirtation or sex—but with the order and boundedness
of work and without the unending demands of family that can reduce the
pleasure of intimacy at home.79 As Arlie Hochschild has documented,
while family was traditionally seen as the haven from the heartless world
of work, for some, work has become a haven from the unbounded and
unregulated stress of the family, particularly for women, who feel family
pressures more acutely than men.80 As one worker noted about her
relative caregiving abilities at home and at work: “I’m a good mom at
home, but I’m a better mom at work.”81
While intimacy at work is more regulated than family or other nonwork intimacy, the work environment also provides for the repeated
contact intimacy needs to flourish.82 In an era of “solo bowlers,” once we
have completed our schooling, the regular proximity necessary to
generate intimate support is rarely available except through work.83

Market, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 319, 320, 335 (2004).
77. See ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 79–81 (2d ed. 1993)
(documenting how, beyond providing childcare, wives host business clients, take notes, and engage
in other supportive behaviors that help husbands succeed at work).
78. For example, in an intimate relationship between a consumer and her nurse, personal trainer,
or hairstylist, the fact that the intimacy arises in the workplace means that the consumer will often
have the opportunity to learn about the workplace dynamics, which puts her in a position to give the
worker more informed advice about how to deal with a superior or a coworker, as the consumer may
also have had the chance to get to know these persons.
79. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 60, at 35–52.
80. See id. at 38–42.
81. Id. at 42.
82. See id. at 35–52.
83. See id. at 40–44 (describing how regular contact in the workplace affords the opportunity for
intimacy to develop there); PATRICIA M. SIAS, ORGANIZING RELATIONSHIPS 65–70 (2009) (same).
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Work thus provides the unique setting that allows meaningful intimacy
to develop outside the family. This special combination of regulated and
regular intimacy means that the support we receive from intimate work
is a “uniquely intense” form of support.84 The experience of ongoing
mutual discovery in a realm where it is always partially secluded is more
explosive than in the realm of the family where members are already
fully disclosed through constant contact.85
Finally, the close worker-consumer relationship in the regulated
context of work also holds value as a key site for promoting equality.
Focusing on relationships between co-workers, Cynthia Estlund
persuasively sets forth the case for work as a critical site of civil society
where workers develop ties of empathy and solidarity with their fellow
citizens.86 She highlights how regulating discrimination promotes more
diverse workplaces, and how relationships between workers of different
races then play a role in combatting racial bias.87 Precisely due to the
intimacy of worker-consumer relationships, intimate work holds the
promise to be such a civil society site on steroids. Closer relationships
between parties of different races or other protected identity
characteristics have a greater potential for overcoming biases than more
distant relationships.88
Introducing a close intimate worker-consumer relationship into
employment not only produces value, but also produces four key
vulnerabilities for workers and consumers alike. First, intimate work
See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY (2010) (describing the decline of communal activities in America since the middle of
the twentieth century).
84. See Marks, supra note 48, at 846.
85. See id.
86. See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1 (2000).
87. Id. at 4.
88. Professor Estlund discusses the mixed evidence behind the contact hypothesis—that bringing
people of different backgrounds together reduces biases—and ultimately concludes that it is likely
to have validity in the work context in light of the circumstances of work. See id. at 22–29.
According to some research, one feature of some intimate work—hierarchy—would undermine the
effect of contact. See id. Other research, however, suggests that the most important factor in
promoting contact’s positive effect is a closer personal relationship. See id.; Yehuda Amir, Contact
Hypothesis in Ethnic Relations, 71 PSYCHOL. BULL. 319 (1969) (finding that intimate contact is an
important factor in contact reducing prejudice); Gregory M. Herek & John P. Capitanio, “Some of
My Best Friends”: Intergroup Contact, Concealable Stigma, and Heterosexuals’ Attitudes Toward
Gay Men and Lesbians, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 412 (1996) (finding that contact,
and especially close contact, with gays and lesbians was correlated with more positive attitudes
toward gays and lesbians). Intimate work of course is defined by closeness, and thus this factor
supports the conclusion of a positive effect of contact in the context of intimate work.
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generates value because of the freedom that intimate workers and
consumers enjoy in forming meaningful relationships. But this also
leaves workers and consumers vulnerable to discrimination in the
formation of these relationships, and in particular, to the employer’s
promotion of discriminatory preferences that interfere with the formation
of these relationships.89
Second, intimate work generates value because of the altruism that
intimate workers and consumers manifest toward one another. But this
leaves workers vulnerable to sacrifice, because their altruism may result
in extra work on behalf of consumers that the employer does not
compensate.90 Moreover, employers may discipline intimate workers
when their altruism entails advocating for the consumer against the
employer’s poor treatment.
Third, intimate work generates value because of shared information
and emotional closeness. But this leaves workers and consumers
vulnerable to exposure by having this personal information revealed or
misused.91 Moreover, both parties are vulnerable to having the
information turned against them as a way to inflict emotional harm.
Finally, intimate work generates value because of the investments
workers and consumers make in these relationships. But this leaves
workers and consumers vulnerable to lost investments when these
relationships rupture, as these investments are relationship-specific, and
are not portable when the relationship ends.92
A fuller explication of the vulnerabilities must wait until the next Part,
as it is only by revealing the law’s ad hoc approach to intimate work that
the vulnerabilities of intimate workers and consumers are brought into
sharp relief. This is because the law’s failure to recognize and protect the
value of intimate work plays a large role in producing these
vulnerabilities.
All told, the value and vulnerability that the intimate workerconsumer relationship produces means that for intimate workers, the
consumer is just as (if not more) important than the employer for
determining wages, conditions, and the overall work experience.93 And

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.D.
See infra Part II.E.
See Dorothy Sue Cobble & Michael Merrill, The Promise of Service Worker Unionism, in
SERVICE WORK: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 153, 160 (Marek Korczynski & Cameron Lynne
Macdonald eds., 2009) (“This attitude prevails regardless of whether the worker’s income is derived
wholly from the customer (the professional in private practice or the self-employed home cleaner),
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for consumers, work—and its regulation—has a significant impact on
key aspects of participation in civil society, including the receipt of
medical, legal, and other important services.

II.

THE LAW OF INTIMATE WORK (AND WHAT IS
MISSING)

Current law divides the regulation of intimacy and the regulation of
work, with separate principles of family and market respectively
governing each sphere. Law has no coherent approach to regulate a
social reality, like intimate work, that combines the two. This ad hoc law
of intimate work harms intimate workers and consumers by failing to
protect the unique value and guard against the unique vulnerability of
intimate work. The result is a law that permits employers to promote
discrimination in the formation of intimate work bonds, to fail to
compensate and even discipline intimate workers for their altruism, to
expose intimate workers and consumers to emotional harm, and to break
valuable intimate work bonds with impunity.
This Part begins by laying out the challenge intimate work poses for
law in light of the categorical regulation of intimacy and work. It then
sets forth the existing law of intimate work, how it fails to address the
value and vulnerability of intimate work, and the resulting harms. It
proceeds in a roughly chronological path through the intimate work
relationship—from the formation of the relationship and the
discrimination that may taint it, to the sacrifice and exposure risked once
the relationship is developed, and finally to the loss of value that can
result when the relationship ruptures.

A.

Legal Categories of Intimacy and Work

A brief discussion of the regulation of intimacy and work aids in
understanding law’s shortcomings with regard to intimate work. The
categorical regulation of intimacy and work presents a challenge for a
reality like intimate work where the two categories overlap.
In some situations—namely within the family—law protects
intimacy.94 Family law recognizes the value intimate relationships
generate by promoting intimate bonds based on affection and support

only partially so (the waiter, bartender, or cab driver), or not at all (the nurse or teacher).”).
94. Scholars have explored how family law circumscribes its protection for care and support to
the domestic family. See generally Murray, supra note 29; Rosenbury, supra note 29.
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within the domestic family.95 Law also protects family intimates from at
least some of the vulnerabilities that can arise in the context of close
relationships, including the risk of sacrifice,96 exposure to emotional
harm,97 and lost investments in the relationship.98 But family law
categorically excludes intimate work from its protections by covering
only those in family or family-like relationships.99 Workers and
consumers are not covered, regardless of how intimate they are.100 Note
that family law is decidedly ambiguous on discrimination, and, in
marriage at least, permits parties to engage in it.101
In other situations—namely within the market—law protects work.102
Work is subject to standard marketplace regulation, including contract
law and tort law, as well as to law that applies especially to the work

95. Family law creates barriers to entry that encourage selectiveness in entering intimate
relationships and makes relationships sticky with waiting periods and formal legal process
requirements for dissolution of these relationships. See CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F.
BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY LAW: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND PERSPECTIVES 211–21, 1386–
96 (3d ed. 2006).
96. Family law imposes reciprocal duties of care and support on spouses to guard against
unreciprocated altruism. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3900, 4300 (West, Westlaw through 2015
Reg. Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-61 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). Family law also
guards against unreciprocated sacrifices by compensating them at the end of the relationship. See,
e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-315(a)(1)(A)(viii) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.)
(providing that homemaking services are considered in property distribution at divorce).
97. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women:
An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 869–73 (1993) (discussing
ways in which law protects spouses from emotional abuse, while acknowledging limits); Melissa
Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal Construction of Intimate
Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1270–71 & n.67 (2009) (discussing criminalization of adultery and
other acts that cause emotional harm in marriage).
98. Family law protects individuals from the loss of relationship-specific investments by
distributing these investments at the end of the relationship through property distribution, alimony,
and child support and custody determinations. See David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal
Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 447, 476–79 (1996).
99. See SCHNEIDER & BRINIG, supra note 95, at 211–21, 1350–1405.
100. Cf. Marion Crain, Arm’s-Length Intimacy: Employment as Relationship, 35 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 163, 174–79 (2011) (discussing how the law’s categories mean that an individual must be
categorized as either a family member or a worker).
101. The law has moved decidedly toward banning the state from discriminating in the context of
the family, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (declaring bans on interracial marriage
unconstitutional); George v. George, 409 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa. 1979) (requiring that divorce law be sex
neutral); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (declaring constitutional
right to same-sex marriage), but still permits individuals to discriminate in making decisions about
who to marry or adopt. See also Emens, supra note 29, at 1315–18.
102. See Zatz, supra note 43, at 380–83 (citing multiple exclusions of non-market work,
including prison work and family work, from work law).
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relationship, including employment law, antidiscrimination law, and
labor law. The legal assignment of intimate relationships to the family
results in a work law premised on the fact that the only significant work
relationship is an arm’s-length one between employer and employee.
This leads to a law of work that is often blind to the intimate workerconsumer relationship and its value.
Nonetheless, because family law simply excludes non-family
intimacy, any law of intimate work must be found in work law. But the
legal categories of intimacy and work create a law of intimate work that
is insensitive to its circumstances. Sometimes, as with non-compete
agreements, work law treats intimate work too much like other work. In
these instances, it either fails to recognize the special circumstances of
intimate work at all and treats all work as simply arm’s-length, or
recognizes only a narrow slice of intimate work and fails to appreciate
how this recognition should extend to a larger set of workers and
consumers. Other times, as with exceptions to wage-and-hour and
antidiscrimination law, when work law recognizes intimate work, it is
too focused on intimacy. It applies regulatory terms from the family
context that are out of place—indeed harmful—in the work context.
These shortcomings of the ad hoc approach to intimate work—treating
intimate work too much like work or too much like family—are
documented in the remainder of this Part.

B.

Discrimination

The introduction of the consumer into the employment relationship
introduces a party who can discriminate against the intimate worker—
and a party against whom the worker can discriminate. While there are
opportunities for a service recipient to discriminate against workers in
many service encounters, intimacy enhances the salience of the
particular worker and her identity to the consumer.103
Intimate workers’ identities can be powerful signals. The intimate
worker is in many ways inseparable from her product: the intimate
services she provides.104 Thus the worker’s identity characteristics “serve
as signifiers . . . shaping customers’ expectations about the service they

103. See, e.g., Harry J. Holzer & Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, Customer Discrimination and Employment
Outcomes for Minority Workers, 113 Q.J. ECON. 835 (1998) (finding that the racial composition of
an establishment’s customers has sizable effects on the race of who gets hired in jobs that involve
direct contact with customers, and hypothesizing that this is due to customer preferences in
relationships).
104. See Leidner, supra note 14, at 100; Wharton, supra note 14, at 152.
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are to receive.”105 The Filipina childcare worker, for instance, is
perceived as caring, family-first, and docile;106 the gay male hairstylist is
perceived as not only stylish but as a gifted interlocutor.107 While the
signal may not be reliable, it is a cheap heuristic in a circumstance where
information costs are high and biases run deep.108
Because of the personal nature of the services, consumers may
perceive identity to be relevant to the provision of services. Identity may
be seen to confer expertise: The Jewish couple may believe that a Jewish
wedding photographer will better capture their wedding, or the black
patient may believe that a black doctor can better relate to her health
circumstances.109 Identity preferences for intimate workers may derive
from a belief that the consumer will face less discrimination from
providers who share the consumer’s identity.110 The sensitive
circumstances of intimate work can also lead consumers to be more
comfortable with workers of a particular identity for more inscrutable
reasons.111 For example, some women simply feel more comfortable
105. Wharton, supra note 14, at 152 (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. See Cameron Lynne Macdonald & David Merrill, Intersectionality in the Emotional
Proletariat, in SERVICE WORK: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 93, at 113, 120–22 (explaining
that “racial/ethnic groups are preferred by parents [for caregivers] based on their presumed qualities
that are rooted in their ethnicity,” and quoting a childcare placement agency owner: “people think
that Filipinas are from a different planet where everybody cares about children” (citation omitted)).
107. See Aaron J. Blashill & Kimberly K. Powlishta, Gay Stereotypes: The Use of Sexual
Orientation as a Cue for Gender-Related Attributes, 61 SEX ROLES 783, 783–84 (2009) (finding
that gay men are stereotyped as having feminine traits, such as empathy, nurturance, and
sensitivity); Steven Petrow, The Problem with the Gays: What Happened to Our Style Gene,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 25, 2011, 11:08 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-petrow/gaystyle-stereotypes_b_840469.html (discussing positive stereotypes of gay men, including
stylishness).
108. For the seminal discussion on labor market signals, see Michael A. Spence, Job Market
Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355, 356–61 (1973), and for more general discussion on signals, see
Akerlof, supra note 70, at 489.
109. See Kimani Paul-Emile, Patients’ Racial Preferences and the Medical Culture of
Accommodation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 462, 464 n.3 (2012) (collecting studies); Tamar Lewin, Women’s
Health Is No Longer a Man’s World, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2001, at A14 (discussing how women’s
preference for female gynecologist is partially rooted in the belief that they will understand
women’s health better because they are women); Damon Adams, Patients Say Best Doctors Are
Ones Who Look Like Them, AMEDNEWS.COM (Jan. 12, 2004), http://www.ama-assn.org/amed.
110. Frederick M. Chen et al., Patients’ Beliefs About Racism, Preferences for Physician Race,
and Satisfaction with Care, 3 ANNALS FAM. MED. 138 (2005) (analyzing surveys showing that
minorities who perceive racism in the healthcare system are more likely to prefer physicians of the
same race); Jennifer Malat & Mary Ann Hamilton, Preference for Same-Race Health Care
Providers and Perceptions of Interpersonal Discrimination in Health Care, 47 J. HEALTH & SOC.
BEHAV. 173 (2006) (same).
111. See, e.g., Lewin, supra note 109 (in context of gynecologists, noting that “many women find
it easier to talk to another woman when the subject is sexuality or menopause or pregnancy”).
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with a female gynecologist or therapist.112
Intimacy also strengthens the motivation to discriminate in the other
direction—from employers (and intimate workers) against consumers—
although these preferences often have more to do with intimate workers’
religious and moral beliefs. This issue has recently received attention in
the context of wedding vendors who have refused service to gay
couples.113
Employers play a role in cultivating and reinforcing these
discriminatory preferences in intimate work settings, which interferes
with the formation of meaningful intimate work relationships between
workers and consumers.114 Indeed, employers’ reliance on identity
characteristics in intimate settings may be the last bastion of acceptable
overt discrimination.115
Law fails to ensure that intimate workers and consumers form these
meaningful relationships free from discriminatory influences. Even
though intimate work increases motivation to rely on identity, work law
provides less protection against discrimination instead of more, leaving
intimate workers and consumers more vulnerable to discrimination. In
this way, law regulates intimate work too much like the family, and fails
to appreciate the unique value of intimate work—intimacy in a more
regulated, equality-promoting setting than the family. Law here limits
not only intimate workers’ equal employment opportunities, but also the
promise of intimate work to enhance equality.

112. See id.; Raquel R. Cabral & Timothy B. Smith, Racial/Ethnic Matching of Clients and
Therapists in Mental Health Services: A Meta-Analytic Review of Preferences, Perceptions, and
Outcomes, 58 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 537 (2011) (finding a moderately strong preference for
therapist of the patient’s own race and ethnicity); Bernadette M. Lauber & Jean Drevenstedt, Older
Adults’ Preferences for Age and Sex of a Therapist, CLINICAL GERONTOLOGIST, 1993, at 13 (finding
sex preferences for therapists); Cynthia F. Pikus & Christopher L. Heavey, Client Preferences for
Therapist Gender, J.C. STUDENT PSYCHOTHERAPY, 1996, at 35 (finding that women prefer women
therapists and that men express little preference).
113. See, e.g., State v. Arlene’s Flowers, No. 13-2-00871-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 2015),
available at http://www.adfmedia.org/files/ArlenesFlowersSJruling.pdf (upholding discrimination
challenge to wedding florist’s refusal to serve gay couple against First Amendment defenses); Elane
Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (upholding discrimination challenge to
wedding photographer’s refusal to serve gay couple against First Amendment defenses); Michael
Paulson & Fernanda Santos, Religious Right in Arizona Cheers Bill Allowing Businesses to Refuse
to Serve Gays, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2014, at A1.
114. See infra notes 137–46 and accompanying text.
115. See Sam Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (documenting how employment discrimination scholarship has become
focused on structural and unconscious biases in the wake of a reduction in overt discrimination).
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Title VII and the BFOQ

At first blush, employment discrimination law recognizes the harm of
discrimination in service work by prohibiting employers from acting on
discriminatory customer preferences.116 But rather than providing greater
protection for discrimination in the intimate services context, the law
provides less. Borrowing a page from family law’s acceptance of
intimate discrimination,117 when work law recognizes work as
sufficiently intimate, it removes sex discrimination protection. Title
VII’s “bona fide occupational qualification” (BFOQ) exception118
exempts from sex discrimination protection erotic workers whose work
sufficiently turns on sexual titillation, such as erotic dancers;119 body
workers who see or touch clients’ genitals, such as labor and delivery
nurses or bathroom attendants;120 and confidence workers for whom a
particular sex is necessary to achieve the therapeutic goals of their work,
such as counselors at a psychiatric hospital for abused children.121 Even
though race is not included in Title VII’s BFOQ exception, intimacy has
in rare circumstances even justified employer reliance on race.122
Recognizing the broader category of intimate work reveals the
arbitrariness of BFOQ line-drawing. Work law here bows to some
discriminatory customer preferences for intimate work services but not

116. See Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that an
employer cannot deny a woman an executive position in the international operations division based
on foreign customer preference to work with men); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d
385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that employer cannot deny a man a position as flight attendant
based on customer preference to be served by women).
117. See Emens, supra note 29, at 1309–10.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2012).
119. Yuracko, supra note 9, at 157 (discussing hypothetical cases as these cases have not been
raised).
120. See Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (attendants
responsible for cleaning bathrooms); Brooks v. ACF Indus., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. W. Va.
1982) (janitor responsible for cleaning bathrooms); EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., No. Civ. 80–1374–
W, 1982 WL 3108 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 1982) (labor and delivery nurse); Backus v. Baptist Med.
Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982) (same).
121. Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1996).
122. In the case of a correctional facility that mimicked military basic training an employer was
allowed to consider race in the selection of officers. In light of the “fierce intimacy” of the boot
camp, race-matching was deemed essential for the black inmates “to play the correctional game of
brutal drill sergeant and brutalized recruit.” Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 1996). But
see Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The privacy interest
that is offended when one undresses in front of a doctor or nurse of the opposite sex does not apply
to race.”).
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others.123 It is difficult to justify why a discriminatory preference for a
body worker who touches sensitive areas like one’s buttocks (e.g., a
massage therapist or personal trainer) is denied while a discriminatory
preference for a body worker who can possibly view one’s genitals (e.g.,
a janitor responsible for cleaning bathrooms) is accepted.124 Likewise, it
is difficult to justify why a discriminatory preference based in
confidences intimacy (e.g., a divorce lawyer, psychotherapist, or weight
loss counselor) is denied while a sex preference based in bodily intimacy
(again, the janitor) is recognized.125
Each of these intimate work circumstances implicates quite intimate
services, and the consumer’s preferences for the massage therapist,
divorce lawyer, psychotherapist, or weight-loss counselor are not clearly
less important or valid than for the janitor. These intimate services
simply implicate different forms of intimacy, and consumers may be
more sensitive to some forms of intimacy than others. Here the law sets
apart and prioritizes certain body work over other forms of intimate
work. Of course, the goal of the law may be to validate some intimacy
preferences and not others.126 My point here is to highlight how the
category of intimate work reveals that there is nothing natural about this
line.127
One might wonder whether acknowledging the broader category of
intimate work might support expanding the recognition of the BFOQ.
After all, if intimate work generates close relationships between the
intimate worker and the consumer, this could argue in favor of granting
consumers, and in turn employers, more leeway in selecting intimate
workers with preferred identities. But the arbitrariness of the BFOQ’s
line-drawing does not point in the direction of expanding the BFOQ to
cover a broader range of intimate work. This is because the BFOQ
123. See generally Amy Kapczynski, Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits of Antidiscrimination
Law, 112 YALE L.J. 1257 (2003) (arguing that customer privacy concerns on which some BFOQ
cases rest are just another form of customer preference).
124. Compare Olsen v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (D. Ariz. 1999) (denying BFOQ
for massage therapist), and EEOC v. Sedita, 816 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (denying BFOQ for
health club instructors), with Norwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1418 (accepting BFOQ for janitor), and
Brooks, 537 F. Supp. at 1125 (same).
125. Compare EEOC v. HI 40 Corp., 953 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mo. 1996) (denying BFOQ for
weight-loss center counselors), with Norwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1418 (accepting BFOQ for janitor),
and Brooks, 537 F. Supp. at 1125 (same).
126. See Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law,
88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 26 (2000) (“Title VII does not simply displace gender practices, but rather
interacts with them in a selective manner,” and by so doing, approves what it does not prohibit.).
127. I am not alone in this critique of intimate work. See Kapczynsky, supra note 123; Yuracko,
supra note 9. The category of intimate work provides another critique.
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imports into work law an outdated strand of intimacy regulation from
family law. The privacy BFOQ cases are built on heteronormative
assumptions of the need for sexual privacy: that concerns about sex and
sexual arousal raised by intimate work can be quelled by providing these
services in a same-sex space.128 Civil and criminal law once did enforce
a norm of no-sex between members of the same sex.129 This constructed
same-sex spaces as a sex-free zone, creating the legal backbone for the
BFOQ to validate same-sex privacy preferences in the context of
intimate work.
Recent changes in family law call this approach into question. With
the unconstitutionality of sodomy laws,130 and the right to same-sex
marriage,131 family law has moved far away from same-sex as a no-sex
zone. BFOQ cases in the therapeutic context (e.g., the child sexual abuse
counselor)132 that rely on the role-modeling theory—that a woman is
better at modeling behavior for a girl and a man is better at modeling
behavior for a boy—are seriously undermined by cases relying on the
opposite conclusion to recognize the rights of same-sex couples.133 In
view of the changes in family law, work law’s recognition of sex-based
intimacy preferences enshrines an outdated law of intimacy.134
Note also that despite the significance of intimate work relationships,
failing to defer to consumer preferences does not impose an undue
burden on consumers. Consumer preferences for intimate workers have
128. Note that cases recognizing the sex-based privacy BFOQ have conditioned it on a preference
for same-sex service provision. See Olsen, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 1060.
129. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
130. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).
131. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015).
132. See, e.g., Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1996)
(accepting BFOQ in part based on theory that “‘[r]ole modeling,’ including parental role modeling,
is an important element of the staff’s job, and a male is better able to serve as a male role model than
a female and vice versa”).
133. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 931–36 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that
state law defining marriage to exclude same-sex marriage was unconstitutional because, inter alia,
argument that children fare better with a father and a mother was unfounded), aff’d sub nom. Perry
v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom., Hollingsworth v. Perry,
570 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 909 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J.,
concurring) (reasoning that “uniting men and women to celebrate the ‘complementarity’ of the sexes
and providing male and female role models for children [is] based on broad and vague
generalizations about the roles of men and women”).
134. Sexual titillation cases can also be seen as deeply heteronormative, but these preferences
have yet to be undermined in the same way. Others have called for greater reform to the
discrimination norms in the context of the family. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire:
Fulfilling Adoptive Parents’ Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE
L.J. 875 (1998); Emens, supra note 29.
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been shown to be quite malleable. While women currently prefer female
gynecologists, this preference arose only relatively recently.135 Until just
a few decades ago, when gynecology was a male profession, women saw
male gynecologists without complaint.136 This shift in preference for
female gynecologists, of course, was prompted in large part by Title VII
requiring equal employment opportunities, which opened up the medical
profession to women. Thus, there is reason to believe that consumer
preferences can be responsive to the force of law.
Even more fundamentally, work law fails to appreciate how work
intimacy differs from family intimacy because of the employer’s role in
determining preferences. Allowing individuals to exercise identity
preferences in the context of family intimacy—i.e., to discriminate in
who to date and marry—is meant to preserve individual liberty.137 By
contrast, one of the unique strengths of intimate work is the existence of
intimacy in a more regulated space, where equality and other values can
be promoted as they are not in the context of family intimacy. And in the
intimate work context, it is not simply individual preferences at stake.
The employer plays a role in cultivating preferences, which may in fact
constrain autonomy in forming intimate work relationships. Work law’s
failure to appreciate the employer-intimate worker-consumer triad means
that work law sometimes overlooks the employer-consumer relationship.
Here, work law takes consumer preferences as given, failing to recognize
the employer’s role in promoting discriminatory consumer preferences,
and how this intervenes in the development of intimate worker-consumer
relationships.
As Vicki Schultz has made clear in the case of employees, individuals
do not come to the workplace with fully formed preferences about
work.138 Rather, work experiences themselves, which are largely
determined by the employer, shape workers’ expectations and
preferences.139 This is no less true for consumers, whose expectations
and preferences are not formed solely or primarily from non-work-

135. See Lewin, supra note 109.
136. See id.
137. See Emens, supra note 29, at 1356–57.
138. See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1749, 1815 (1990) (“[W]omen’s work preferences are formed, created, and recreated in
response to changing work conditions.”).
139. Id. at 1816 (describing the variety of mechanisms employers use to “structure opportunities
and incentives and maintain work cultures and relations so as to disempower most women from
aspiring to and succeeding in traditionally male jobs”).
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related experiences. Rather, our experiences receiving intimate work
services, which are largely determined by employers, help to shape our
expectations and preferences for intimate work services.140
Multiple examples illustrate how employers make intimate worker
identity more salient for consumers. A host of employer websites
advertise intimate workers on the basis of protected identity traits. These
are particularly popular for domestic care work: Rent-a-Grandma, Renta-Grandpa, Rent-a-Mom, and Rent-a-Dad.141 The identity of the person
tells you what she does: Rent-a-Grandma provides caregiving services;
Rent-a-Grandpa does household repairs. Other businesses emphasize
identity as a selling point for their intimate workers. Women Ob/Gyn, a
“group of five female OB/GYN’s, and three nurse practitioners,” is
“women, helping women.”142 The Women’s Law Group is a law firm
specializing in divorce composed of “female attorneys who . . . practice
law from a woman’s perspective.”143
Yet other businesses make protected identity traits salient by allowing
consumers to select intimate workers on the basis of these traits. When a
customer is booking a massage, a spa’s first question is often, “Do you
prefer a male or female massage therapist?”144 For online appointment
bookings, some hair salons allow customers to select their hairstylist
from a drop-down menu either by name, or by simply selecting “male”
or “female.”145 Not only do such questions allow selection on the basis
of sex, but they suggest that sex is the most important criteria for
selecting an intimate worker.
140. Other scholars have recognized the role of the law in shaping even our most intimate
preferences. See Emens, supra note 29, at 1366–74, for a discussion of the law’s role in structuring,
as she terms it, “the accidents of sex and love”—the likelihood of dating and marrying people from
particular identity groups.
141. See sources cited supra note 13.
142. WOMEN OB/GYN, http://www.womenobgyn.com (last visited Aug. 12, 2015) (giving the
tagline “Women, helping women” and describing “group of five female OB/GYN’s, and three nurse
practitioners,” with a photograph of only women providers). In the past fifteen years, the rising
demand for female gynecologists and obstetricians has led to a rise in all-female practices. See Kate
Stone Lombardi, A Clinic Where All the Doctors Are Women, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2000, at WE8.
143. THE WOMEN’S LAW GROUP, http://thewomenslawgroup.com (last visited Aug. 12, 2015)
(“At The Women’s Law Group, we understand that going through a divorce, custody issue, or other
family law matter can be one of the most difficult times of your life. Our Tampa divorce attorneys
and
staff
are
here
to
help
you.”);
WOMEN’S
DIVORCE
RIGHTS,
http://www.womensdivorcerights.com/about.php (last visited Aug. 12, 2015) (“Founded . . . to
support, inspire, and encourage women . . . during each stage of their lives.”).
144. Erika Allen, The First Issue in Any Massage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2012, at ST22.
145. See Select Service(s) and Employee(s), Bubbles Hair Salon, BUBBLES,
https://bubbles.mylocalsalon.com/onlinebooking/v7410/Steps/SelectServices.aspx?siteid=d2a0742a0aba-e011-9d91-0050563fff01&event=1 (last visited Aug. 12, 2015).
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In the context of erotic workers, employers cultivate the demand for
sexy workers and the sex preferences that accompany them. Businesses
convert food servers and bartenders into intimate workers who sell
sexual titillation in restaurants, bars, and clubs like Hooters, and with it
cultivate sex-specific preferences—typically for women—in these
otherwise sex-neutral roles.146
But without a concrete adverse employment action (e.g., failure to
hire), the employer’s promotion of discriminatory consumer preferences
does not result in a Title VII claim.147 While Title VII bars employers
from “classify[ing]” employees or applicants in a way that “deprive[s]”
them of employment opportunities,148 an employee would have a
difficult time proving causation: that a sex-segregated drop-down box,
for example, was a classification that limited employment opportunities.
Moreover, much of this discrimination is at the hiring stage, and these
types of claims are notoriously rare and difficult to prosecute.149
To the extent that law permits employers to cultivate and reinforce
consumers’ discriminatory preferences, this helps to shape preferences
by legitimating rather than disrupting such preferences, particularly by
creating the environment in which intimate services are delivered. If
consumers have their preferences accommodated, this reinforces their
preexisting view that this is the only acceptable way these services may
be delivered. Employers’ role in constructing discriminatory preferences
then interferes with the free formation of meaningful intimate work
relationships.
This can have a significant impact on the employment opportunities
of intimate workers. Discriminatory preferences can lead to fewer
customers or worse reviews, which can reduce earnings and limit work
opportunities more generally.150 Systematic discriminatory preferences
146. Diane Avery & Marion Crain, Branded: Corporate Image, Sexual Stereotyping, and the New
Face of Capitalism, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 13, 78–100 (2007) (detailing how casino
bartenders are sexualized); Ann C. McGinley, Harassing “Girls” at the Hard Rock: Masculinities
in Sexualized Environments, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1229, 1271–74 (same). The well-known case of
Darlene Jespersen involved a bartender who was eroticized into a “bar babe” by her employer’s
imposition of a sex-specific grooming code. See Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104
(9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
147. See, e.g., Beyer v. Cnty. of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2008) (requiring adverse
employment action for Title VII claim to proceed); Jones v. Reliant Energy, 336 F.3d 689 (8th Cir.
2003) (same).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012).
149. See Naomi Schoenbaum, It’s Time That You Know: The Shortcomings of Ignorance as
Fairness in Employment Law and the Need for an “Information-Shifting Model,” 30 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 99, 140 (2007).
150. See Laurence M. Kahn, Customer Discrimination and Affirmative Action, 29 ECON. INQUIRY
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for intimate workers of a particular identity can also have more
systematic consequences, including occupational segregation, as workers
decide what jobs to fill based on consumer demand. Gynecological
medicine, for example, has become increasingly female-dominated as
more women express a preference for female gynecologists.151
A few courts have begun to recognize the role that employers play in
shaping discriminatory preferences for intimate workers. In a case
denying a residential care facility’s claim that residents’ racial
preference for certified nursing assistants constituted a BFOQ, the court
proposed that the employer could “attempt to reform the resident’s
behavior after admission.”152 A case denying sex as a BFOQ for massage
therapists went further, discussing how the employer perpetuated
customers’ biases by asking for their sex preference.153 The court
suggested that the spa could instead provide customers with a
“description of the therapists’ qualifications,” and could quell privacy
concerns by informing customers of draping policies and telling them
that they “can instruct therapists about where they may and may not
touch.”154 The court was confident about the impact on customer
preferences: “More information about the process, along with a reduced
focus on gender and an increased focus on qualifications, may alter the
extent to which clients of both sexes are willing to engage the services of
a male.”155

2.

Public Accommodations Law

The law regulating discrimination against consumers also does too
little to protect them from employer-promoted bias. Public
accommodation laws ban businesses from discriminating against
consumers, but they nonetheless allow employers to act in ways that
continue to promote biases against both consumers and intimate
workers.156 Unlike consumer preferences for intimate workers of a
555 (1991) (finding that customer discrimination can result in long-run wage differentials).
151. See Lewin, supra note 109 (documenting that women now comprise over seventy percent of
ob/gyn residents and attributing this to patient demand and quoting chairman of the Council on
Resident Education in Obstetrics and Gynecology that this is “a huge issue for male medical
students”).
152. Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2010).
153. Olsen v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1070 (D. Ariz. 1999).
154. Id. at 1072–73.
155. Id. at 1074. Both men and women overwhelmingly express a preference for a female
massage therapist when asked. See Allen, supra note 144.
156. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012) (banning discrimination in public accommodations on
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particular identity arising out of privacy interests, the basis for intimate
worker preferences for consumers of a particular identity is more often
grounded in religion or the right to expression, for example, wedding
vendors who prefer not to serve gay and lesbian couples out of a
religious objection to same-sex marriage. Intimate workers and their
employers have typically lost in cases brought by consumers challenging
discrimination against them under public accommodations laws.157
Despite consumers prevailing in these cases, the public
accommodation cases give short shrift to the role of the employer in
cultivating discrimination affecting both consumers and intimate
workers. Take the well-known case out of New Mexico that upheld a
finding of discrimination against a wedding photographer who refused to
provide services to gay couples in violation of the state public
accommodations law.158 The employer argued that the law compelled the
expression of support for gay marriage, which the employer objected to
as violating the right to freedom of expression and free exercise of
religion.159 In rejecting these defenses, the court noted that the employer
could continue to express its views by “post[ing] a disclaimer on their
website or in their studio advertising that they oppose same-sex
marriage.”160
the basis of race, national origin, and religion); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7(F) (West, Westlaw
through 2015 1st Spec. Sess.) (banning discrimination in public accommodations on the basis of,
inter alia, race, religion, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, spousal affiliation).
157. See N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp. v. Superior Court, 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008) (holding
that doctors who refused fertility treatment to lesbian patient violated state public accommodation
law); Nathanson v. MCAD, No. 199901657, 2003 WL 22480688 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 16, 2003)
(holding that divorce lawyer who catered to women clients violated state public accommodation law
by refusing to represent male client); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013)
(holding that wedding photographer who refused to service gay couples violated state public
accommodation law). I exclude from consideration laws that exempt certain body workers (doctors)
from performing certain services (abortions) on the basis of religious objection because these laws
exempt services rather than persons from the protection of public accommodations laws.
It is not yet clear whether this will change in the wake of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), which allowed employers an exception from the mandate to
provide contraception coverage in their health care plans on religious grounds. Two noted scholars
have concluded that concern that the decision will broaden religious exceptions for employers in
other contexts is overblown. See Ira Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Hobby Lobby in the Long Run,
CORNERSTONE (July 1, 2014), http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/rfp/blog/hobby-lobby-in-thelong-run. Note that an employer’s religious freedom defense in a case like Elane would arise under
a state analogue to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act that controlled in Hobby Lobby, as that
statute applies only against the federal government. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997).
158. Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 53.
159. Id. at 63.
160. Id. at 59, 68 (noting that the public accommodation law also does not require the employer
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This type of employer action not only undermines the law’s aim at
preventing dignitary (and even material) harms to protected groups; it
cultivates the exact discriminatory preferences against consumers that
the law was meant to combat. Such public expressions reinforce the
discriminatory preferences of the intimate workers who provide services
at the firm. A firm that provides wedding photography services to the
public while openly expressing opposition to gay marriage signals
discriminatory preferences to gay customers, while remaining in
technical compliance with the law. Such a firm is unlikely to get any gay
couples as customers, and thus intimate workers will not need to
confront or put to the side their biases in the provision of intimate
services.
Moreover, such employer actions reinforce discriminatory preferences
not only for consumers, but for intimate workers. The same New Mexico
law that bans sexual orientation discrimination in public
accommodations also bans such discrimination in employment.161 A sign
posted by the employer disapproving of gay marriage cultivates and
reinforces biases against gay workers as well, and likewise signals to gay
applicants that they are not welcome as employees. Again, without an
adverse employment action, there is no relief for this cultivation of
discriminatory bias by employers.162

C.

Sacrifice

The value-generating altruism that is a hallmark of intimate work
means that both the intimate worker and the consumer may act against
their own self-interest to benefit the other.163 For example, employers
“to either include photographs of same-sex couples in its advertisements or display them in its
studio”).
161. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7(A) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Spec. Sess.) (“It is an
unlawful discriminatory practice for . . . an employer [with fifteen or more employees] . . . to refuse
to hire, to discharge, to promote or demote or to discriminate in matters of compensation, terms,
conditions or privileges of employment against any person otherwise qualified because of . . . the
employee’s sexual orientation . . . .”); id. § 28-1-7(F) (“It is an unlawful discriminatory practice
for . . . any person in any public accommodation to make a distinction, directly or indirectly, in
offering or refusing to offer its services, facilities, accommodations or goods to any person because
of . . . sexual orientation . . . .”).
162. See supra notes 147–49 and accompanying text.
163. For discussions of how certain forms of work can be invisible—and the adverse
consequences—see, for example, ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART:
COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN FEELING 7 (2d ed. 2003) (providing the seminal study on invisible
emotional labor—work we do to create a particular feeling or state of mind in others—and
documenting a variety of resulting harms); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1307 (2000) (explaining how invisible work is not rewarded formally or
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who engage in cost-cutting strategies may be saved from their adverse
effects on customers by intimate workers’ willingness to increase their
work efforts without additional compensation.164 So, for example, in
response to layoffs, intimate workers may intensify effort or work more
hours.165 “[B]ecause they care,” intimate workers “are not as prepared to
jeopardize their relationship with those for whom they care in pursuit of
their own self-interest as other workers may be.”166
Sometimes intimate workers sacrifice by violating employer policies
to benefit consumers. A particularly telling example comes from a recent
study of Motherhood, Inc.167 The now defunct company provided
instruction and guidance to new mothers and relied on its employees to
develop intimate relationships with customers.168 But the company also
relied on employees to recommend its products consistently, even
though doing so would undermine their function as trusted confidantes
to their clients, which presumably makes the company valuable to its
customers.169 To develop intimacy and perform the work required,
employees had to engage in a “difficult decoupling” of their intimate
relationships with customers and the employer’s profit motive, captured
well by one employee’s comment: “It’s hard to support moms by
upselling.”170 Many employees opted out of such difficult decoupling by
refusing to recommend the company’s products.171
Such risky sacrifices by intimate workers come in many forms. Home
health aides violate the policy against giving out their home telephone
numbers to their clients or visiting them off hours.172 A nurse engages in
informally).
164. See Susan Himmelweit, Caring Labor, 561 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 27, 33
(1999).
165. Id.; Paula England, Emerging Theories of Care Work, 31 ANN. REV. SOC. 381, 390 (2005)
(explaining that “emotional bonds put care workers in a vulnerable position, discouraging them from
demanding higher wages or changes in working conditions that might have adverse effects on care
recipients”).
166. Himmelweit, supra note 164, at 33 (discussing this phenomenon in the context of
caregivers); see also England, supra note 165, at 390 (describing this as “[a] kind of emotional
hostage effect”).
167. See Catherine Turco, Difficult Decoupling: Employee Resistance to the Commercialization
of Personal Settings, 118 AM. J. SOC. 380 (2012). The company name nicely evokes the core
tension of intimate work: the fundamentally intimate nature of motherhood and the fundamentally
instrumental nature of the market.
168. Id. at 389–91, 396.
169. Id. at 398–400.
170. Id. at 380, 399.
171. Id. at 398.
172. See Stone, supra note 61, at 105. Stone also explains how hospice volunteers choose not to
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a “small act of rebellion” by unclipping the hospital phone, pulling out
its batteries, and closing a particularly vulnerable patient’s room door to
“sit[] down beside her patient, just to be near.”173
The employer determines the consequences of these intimate worker
efforts by either rewarding these efforts, or, by contrast, failing to reward
or even penalizing workers for them. Engaging in intimate behaviors that
go unrewarded, or, worse yet, result in discipline, puts intimate workers
at risk of foregoing the material rewards of work—compensation and
continued employment.174 Note that although consumers also engage in
altruism, intimate workers’ sacrifices render them more vulnerable
because employers have far greater ability and motivation to impose
harmful consequences on workers than on consumers.
Work law regulates the rewards and penalties that result from
employment to ensure adequate compensation for workers’ efforts and to
protect against workplace injury and retaliation. A number of
protections, such as minimum wage guarantees175 and retaliation
protection,176 are afforded when the employee is engaged in work. But
when it comes to intimate work, the law fails to compensate all of the
work that intimacy generates, and fails to protect intimate workers who
act on behalf of their consumers from retaliation. To the extent the law
recognizes intimate work as different here, it again borrows a page from
family law’s regulation of intimacy, subtracting protection for the
compensation of intimate work, rather than adding more. This leaves
intimate workers vulnerable to employers’ failure to compensate, and
even to penalize, their altruism. Law’s failure to compensate and protect
altruism undermines the relational and emotional aspects of market
behavior that are fundamental to intimate work.

1.

Wage-and-Hour Law

Despite the additional productive efforts that intimate work generates,
intimate workers may not end up materially better off for these efforts.
get Medicare certification, which would allow them to be paid, because they do not want to comply
with the intimacy boundaries imposed by the program, such as the policy against giving out home
phone numbers. Id.
173. Sara Corbett, The Last Shift, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2003, at 61.
174. For example, the nurse who fails to answer her hospital phone to spend quality time with a
patient might be disciplined for doing so, see id., or a Motherhood, Inc. employee who refuses to
recommend the company’s products to her consumers might be terminated for failing to meet her
sales quota, see supra notes 167–71 and accompanying text.
175. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012) (minimum wage); id. § 207 (overtime).
176. See, e.g., id. § 158 (retaliation protection).
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Combining intimacy with work increases the odds that intimate work is
made invisible to the employer. When work is viewed as undergirded by
love and affection, its productive value is not appreciated.177 Friendship
between the intimate worker and the consumer, for example, may be
seen as an adjunct to the work, or perhaps even a distraction, rather than
a critical feature of intimate work that tends to enhance efficiency.178
Work law does little to address the invisibility of intimate work or
ensure that intimate workers are compensated for all of it, and instead
treats intimate work too much like family intimacy. The Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) guarantees a minimum hourly wage plus
overtime.179 To the extent this law recognizes intimate work, it removes
rights to compensation, just as the law restricts compensation for work
done in the family.180 Wage-and-hour protection is limited for some of
the most intimate domestic workers.181
177. For a discussion of this phenomenon in the context of the family, see generally Silbaugh,
supra note 9 (arguing that the law fails to recognize housework as work because of the affectionate
familial context in which the work is performed).
178. See, e.g., ZELIZER, supra note 62, at 241–44 (discussing how, in the context of coworkers,
intimacy in the workplace is seen as antithetical to production based on a commonly held view that
intimacy and production should exist in separate spheres).
179. See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (minimum wage); id. § 207 (overtime).
180. This principle of non-compensation for work done within the domestic family is colorfully
expressed in one seminal case refusing to enforce a contract for a wife to receive compensation for
providing care for her ailing husband: “[E]ven if few things are left that cannot command a price,
marital support remains one of them.” Borelli v. Brusseau, 12 Cal. App. 4th 647, 655 (1993).
181. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (exempting babysitters and companions for the elderly from
overtime and minimum wage); id. § 213(b)(21) (exempting live-in domestic workers from
overtime). In 2013, the Department of Labor issued a rule that would extend wage-and-hour
protection to companions for the elderly (typically referred to as home healthcare workers)
employed by third-party agencies, see 29 C.F.R. § 552.109 (2014), after the Supreme Court had held
that these intimate workers were exempt under existing regulations, see Long Island Care at Home,
Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 162 (2007). Before the rule was to take effect on January 1, 2015, the
regulation was vacated, see Home Care Ass’n of Am. v. Weil, 76 F. Supp. 3d 138, 140 (D.D.C. Dec.
22, 2014), but that decision was reversed, see Home Care Ass’n of Am. v. Weil, No. 15-5018, 2015
WL 4978980, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 21, 2015). In 2013, the Department also narrowed the definition
of “companionship” work that qualifies for the exemption. See 29 C.F.R. § 552.6(b) (excluding
from the exemption companions who spend more than twenty percent of their time on care work).
This regulation was also vacated, see Home Care Ass’n of Am. v. Weil, 78 F. Supp. 3d 123, 124
(D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2015), a decision that was likewise reversed, see Home Care Ass’n of Am., 2015
WL 4978980, at *1. It is too soon to tell whether the appellate rulings will be upset by en banc or
Supreme Court review.
Another notable set of intimate workers exempt from wage-and-hour protections is teachers. See
29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (including within an exemption to the FLSA “any employee employed in the
capacity of academic administrative personnel or teacher in elementary or secondary schools”); 29
C.F.R. § 541.303(a) (applying exemption to “any employee with a primary duty of teaching,
tutoring, instructing or lecturing in the activity of imparting knowledge”); id. § 541.204(b)
(expanding the “educational establishments” covered to include “an elementary or secondary school
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Indeed, for purposes of coverage under wage-and-hour law, courts
distinguish between efforts motivated by intimacy and efforts motivated
by service to the employer, assuming that there is little or no overlap,
and leaving intimate work uncompensated. In the case of a K-9 officer
seeking compensation for the time he spent caring for his police dog at
home, for example, the Second Circuit responded “[a]t some point, an
officer’s attention to his assigned dog may not be provided primarily for
the employer’s benefit but rather out of the caretaker’s own sense of love
and devotion to the animal in his charge.”182
So, when intimate workers engage in certain forms of intimacy, the
law does not treat or protect these activities as work. The law’s division
between intimacy and work does not reflect reality, as legal scholars
have made clear in the context of the family.183 Intimate work can
contribute as much value to the consumer and the employer as any other
efforts of the intimate worker, and, in fact, adding intimacy to work
often enhances its productive value.184 Recognizing the productive value
of intimate work need not negate or undermine intimacy. Sociologists
and economists have found that economic exchange coexists with
motives of care and altruism in a range of relationships, and that workers
can successfully combine motives of love and money.185 The law’s
continuing divide between intimacy and work leaves intimate workers
undercompensated for the value they generate.

2.

Retaliation

Work law’s failure to recognize the overlap of intimacy and work also
means that it does little to address the double bind that intimate workers
face when employers penalize intimate workers for acting altruistically
toward consumers. Work law that typically limits the harms that
system, an institution of higher education or other educational institution”). For a discussion of this
problem in the context of adjunct professors, see Trisha Pande, Professors at the Poverty Line:
Protecting Adjunct Professors Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (Apr. 20, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the author).
182. Holzapfel v. Newburgh, 145 F.3d 516, 523 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Velez v. Sanchez, 693
F.3d 308, 315, 330 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that whether a worker who lived with her stepsister’s
family acted out of love in providing care for the children is one consideration in determining if she
was an employee entitled to wage-and-hour protections).
183. See Silbaugh, supra note 9, at 17–18 (documenting the valuable production done in the
household); cf. Hasday, supra note 29, at 497–99 (arguing that economic exchange—a hallmark of
productive market behavior—is ubiquitous in the family).
184. See supra Part I.B.
185. See ZELIZER, supra note 62, at 250–55; Nancy Folbre & Julie A. Nelson, For Love or
Money—Or Both?, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 123 (2000).
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employers can inflict on workers for doing their jobs and standing up for
their rights does little to protect intimate workers who act on behalf of
their consumers because work law, insensitive to the overlap of work
and intimacy, sees these as acts of intimacy unrelated to work. Work
law’s failure to extend protection against discipline to these acts of
intimate work converts altruism into sacrifice.
Work law that protects employees who advocate for their own workrelated interests fails to protect intimate workers who advocate for their
work interests—their consumers. The National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) grants employees, whether unionized or not, the right “to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or
protection” without retaliation.186 But the NLRA has ignored intimate
worker-consumer bonds in evaluating when such activities are
“mutual”—i.e., in furtherance of the interest of both the complaining
employee and those on whose behalf she complains.187 For example,
when a counselor in a facility for disturbed children protests the quality
of treatment, this is viewed as only in the interest of the children and not
also in the employee’s interest, and thus does not qualify as protected
“mutual aid.”188 Courts will sometimes allow such cases to proceed, but
only by contorting such actions to fit within work law’s narrow view of
what counts as a work-related concern—self-interested economic
gain.189
186. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157–158.
187. As Richard Michael Fischl and Cynthia Estlund have argued, the application of the “mutual
aid or protection” provision has been limited by work law’s conception of activity being in the
employee’s work interest only when it is in the employee’s narrow economic self-interest. See
Cynthia L. Estlund, What Do Workers Want? Employee Interests, Public Interests, and Freedom of
Expression Under the National Labor Relations Act, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 921 (1992); Richard
Michael Fischl, Self, Others, and Section 7: Mutualism and Protected Protest Activities Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 789 (1989).
188. See Lutheran Soc. Serv. of Minn., Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 35, 42 (1980) (counselors for troubled
children who complained that proposed program changes would negatively affect the children); see
also Five Star Transp., Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. 42, 46 (2007) (school bus drivers who wrote letters to
school about transportation safety concerns only “implicate[d] the safety of children, not the
common concerns of employees”); Orchard Park Health Care Ctr., Inc., 341 N.L.R.B. 642, 644
(2004) (nursing home employees who called the state health department patient care hotline to
report poor customer conditions “were concerned about the quality of the care and welfare of the
residents, not their own working conditions”); Advice Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc.
Gen. Counsel in the N.L.R.B. Office of Gen. Counsel, to Richard L. Ahearn, Regional Director of
Region 19, The Wedge Corp., No. 19-CA-32981, 2011 WL 4526829 (N.L.R.B.G.C.), at *3 (Sept.
19, 2011) (bartender’s Facebook posts regarding concerns about customer service are not protected
because “employee concerns about the quality of care and the welfare of patients or clients are not
interests encompassed by the ‘mutual aid or protection’ clause” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
189. See, e.g., Misericordia Hosp. Med. Ctr., 246 N.L.R.B. 351, 357 (1979), enforced, 623 F.2d
808 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that a nurse who was terminated for protesting unsanitary conditions
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Altruism itself—an endemic feature of intimate work—is not
considered worthy of protection. An intimate worker acting to benefit
the consumer necessarily implicates the interest of the worker not solely
because it matters for her personal economic gain, although it does, and
not solely because the intimate work relationship is a formative part of
an intimate worker’s working conditions, although it is.190 For intimate
workers, caring about the consumer means that the welfare of the
consumer on its own affects the intimate worker’s welfare.
Work law has yet to recognize how intimate workers’ tendency to
sacrifice for their consumers could leave them unprotected against
retaliation under other laws as well. Antidiscrimination law protects
employees who complain of discrimination from retaliation.191 The
forms of retaliation that are prohibited are quite broad—essentially
anything that the employer can do that might dissuade a reasonable
worker from complaining.192 In Thompson v. North American Stainless,
LP,193 the Supreme Court recognized that an employer firing an
employee’s fiancé after that employee complained of discrimination
would dissuade a reasonable employee from complaining.194 But no
court has yet applied such a theory to intimate workers. So an intimate
worker—say a camp counselor—who complained of discrimination
could be retaliated against by an employer withdrawing resources from
her campers without relief.195
Occasionally, an intimate worker who sacrifices on behalf of a
consumer and is then fired will be protected by a claim for termination in
violation of public policy.196 But such claims turn on the fortuity of state
and inadequate staffing engaged in protected activity because her protest contained passing
reference to employee work circumstances); Estlund, supra note 187, at 936.
190. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of how the quality of intimate work bonds affects
productivity and other conditions of work.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he
has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing under this subchapter.”).
192. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 173–74 (2011).
193. 562 U.S. 170 (2011).
194. Id. at 174.
195. The Court expressly refrained from drawing any bright line that would limit its holding. Id.
at 174–75. This holds promise for protection of intimate worker sacrifices. However, family-like
intimacy—a fiancé—is a far easier case than a work intimate. I return to Thompson’s potential for
the protection of intimate work in Part III.B.1.b, infra.
196. Compare Kirk v. Mercy Hosp. Tri-Cnty., 851 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)
(upholding claim for termination in violation of public policy brought by nurse who was fired after
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law: the existence of a relevant state statute and a court willing to
interpret it broadly to support the public policy at issue.

D.

Exposure

The established intimate work relationship also renders consumers
and intimate workers vulnerable to exposure. When one party gives
another party access to private information, this creates a risk that the
receiving party will not keep it confidential, or will use it against the
other party.197 Because intimate work is premised on a consumer sharing
private information with a worker,198 intimate work exposes the
consumer to the vulnerability that the worker will misuse this
information. And this risk of exposure can go in both directions. Because
intimate workers often share personal information about themselves with
consumers, and indeed rely on this type of intimacy to enhance the
productive value of the relationship,199 intimate workers too can be
vulnerable to this type of exposure.
Intimacy also provides additional access and opportunity to impose
other types of harm. It is well-known that work poses the opportunity for
bullying, harassment, and abuse, and not only on the basis of protected
identity traits.200 Intimate work only heightens the opportunity for such
harm to occur, as intimacy provides additional avenues to push buttons
and to emotionally manipulate one’s target.201
The regular exposure that work often provides means that there is not
a simple means for the intimate worker to avoid abusive or demeaning
treatment by the consumer. In such circumstances, workers, if they
remain in their jobs, have little choice but to accept the intimacy and its
complaining about poor patient care out of concern for patient based on state nursing law), with
Wright v. Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children, 589 N.E.2d 1241, 1242 (Mass. 1992) (rejecting
claim for termination in violation of public policy brought by nurse who was fired after complaining
about poor patient care based on nursing code of ethics).
197. See Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665, 675–76 (2009)
(discussing duty of confidentiality that arises in appropriate circumstances to protect against an
abuse when principal shares private information with agent).
198. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
200. See David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of “Workplace Bullying” and the Need for StatusBlind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 475, 484–85 (2000) (documenting the
prevalence of general workplace bullying).
201. See Mara Brendgen et al., Verbal Abuse by the Teacher During Childhood and Academic,
Behavioral, and Emotional Adjustment in Young Adulthood, 99 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 26 (2007);
Premilla D’Cruz & Ernesto Noronha, The Limits to Workplace Friendship: Managerialist HRM and
Bystander Behaviour in the Context of Workplace Bullying, 33 EMP. REL. 269 (2011).
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attendant emotional vulnerability. While intimate work poses similar
risks to the consumer, they are typically less constrained from seeking
services elsewhere in the market.
While fiduciary duties guard against a small subset of intimate work
exposure, the law fails to capture the full range of this vulnerability,
treating much of intimate work too much like any other work. Duties to
protect against the harms of exposure in intimate work relationships are
owed only by some intimate workers toward their consumers—and not
the other way around. Areas of work law, like workers’ compensation,
that prevent or remedy workplace injuries are premised on a model of
physical rather than interpersonal injury, and thus fail to address the type
of exposure that intimate work generates. In this way, the law fails to
take seriously the intimacy that is a predicate for productivity across the
full range of intimate work and the risk of harm this imposes.

1.

Fiduciary Duties

To the extent that work law recognizes the potential for harmful
exposure from the intimate work relationship, it does so primarily in the
form of fiduciary duties running from intimate workers to their
consumers. Professional licensing standards and codes of professional
ethics place legal and moral duties on intimate workers to avoid
imposing a variety of harms on vulnerable consumers.202 Certain
intimate workers, such as doctors and lawyers, owe formal fiduciary
duties to their consumers because of the high levels of trust and
dependence inherent in such relationships.203 Such relationships impose
obligations on these intimate workers to, among other things, act in their
consumers’ best interests and keep their confidences.204
Beyond formal fiduciary duties imposed by virtue of relationship
status, courts may impose duties of loyalty and care on the basis of trust
and dependence arising out of the circumstances of a particular
relationship. These are typically referred to as informal fiduciary
relationships or confidential relationships.205 Courts that take a more
202. See ZELIZER, supra note 40, at 18–21 (recounting such a code for psychotherapists); Tamar
Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 815–16 (1983) (discussing these standards for
doctors and lawyers).
203. See, e.g., Clancy v. State Bar, 454 P.2d 329, 333 (Cal. 1969) (en banc) (per curiam)
(attorney-client); Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 961 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (doctorpatient).
204. See Hasday, supra note 29, at 522–24.
205. See Leib, supra note 197, at 700–02 (collecting cases denying claims for fiduciary duty
based on friendship).
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generous approach to the application of fiduciary duties have found such
relationships to arise running from a number of intimate workers—
nurses,206 social workers,207 therapists,208 pastors,209 hairstylists210—to
their consumers. These fiduciary duties go a good way toward protecting
consumers from exposure that may arise in the intimate work
relationship.
However, courts that take a narrower approach will deny fiduciary
protection when a relationship is deemed to be among equals rather than
between one dominant and one subordinate party.211 In these
jurisdictions, intimate work relationships that are not seen to involve
dominance by the intimate worker over the consumer will not merit
fiduciary protection for the consumer.212 And this limitation will restrict
the application of duties running from consumers to intimate workers,
even when the parties develop a friendship, because the intimate worker
will be unlikely to establish dominance by the consumer. Despite the fact
that many intimate workers develop bilaterally intimate relationships as
a way to produce closer and more productive bonds with consumers,213
and are encouraged to do so by their employers,214 they may be without
recourse should the consumer turn against them. The consumer,

206. See Estate of Bliss v. Williams, 18 Cal. Rptr. 821, 827 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (confidential
relationship existed between decedent and nurse who took care of “his physical needs and quite
frequently acted for him in his business and property matters”); see also Iacometti v. Frassinelli, 494
S.W.2d 496, 499 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973) (“It is that relationship where confidence is placed by one in
the other and the recipient of that confidence is the dominant personality, with the ability, because of
that confidence, to influence and exercise dominion over the weaker or dominated party, such as
nurse and invalid, trusted business adviser and friend etc.” (citing Bayliss v. Williams, 46 Tenn. (6
Cold.) 440 (1869)).
207. Abeyta v. Soos ex rel. Cnty. of Pinal, 319 P.3d 996, 996 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014); Heinrich v.
Silvernail, 500 N.E.2d 835, 836 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986).
208. United States v. Ghane, 673 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012); In re Kimberly C., No. 3-11-0412,
2011 WL 10481304 (Ill. App. Ct. Nov. 9, 2011).
209. In re Succession of Stamm, 43 So. 3d 326 (La. Ct. App. 2010).
210. In re Brodbeck v. James, 915 P.2d 145, 152 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (“We find the close
friendship and trust attested to by James and Hart [hairstylist] was sufficient evidence of the
existence of a confidential relationship.”).
211. See Carlson v. SALA Architects, Inc., 732 N.W.2d 324, 330 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007)
(requiring one party “who enjoys a superior position in terms of knowledge and authority and in
whom the other party places a high level of trust and confidence”); Leib, supra note 197, at 693, 702
(describing two-part test requiring showing of “trust and vulnerability, dominance, or influence”).
212. See, e.g., Grow v. Ind. Retired Teachers Cmty., 271 N.E.2d 140, 143–44 (Ind. Ct. App.
1971) (rejecting informal fiduciary relationship running from retirement home and its workers to
resident because requisite dominance was not present).
213. See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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precisely because of her situation at the intersection of intimacy and
work, has an inside view of the intimate worker’s business and may
become a trusted advisor and critical source of word-of-mouth
advertising.215 Nonetheless, intimate workers’ exposure will often go
unprotected. The obligations of consumers to intimate workers are then
the same as any arm’s-length deal, sounding only in basic tort or
contract.

2.

Harassment

Moreover, while consumers can typically exit a relationship with an
intimate worker that has become hostile or otherwise destructive, the
intimate worker may only be able to do so by giving up her job. Intimate
workers have little say about who receives their services.216
Work law may require workers and consumers to come together by
banning segregation, but aside from sexual harassment law, it does little
to keep them apart.217 And sexual harassment law only addresses a
narrow source of emotional harm that arises at work: when harassing
conduct based on sex rises to the level of a hostile work environment. 218
Beyond the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, some
jurisdictions outside the United States hold employers liable for failing
to maintain an environment free of bullying or harassment.219 But even if
such a standard were adopted here, the closeness of intimate work
relationships means that they expose workers to the threat of emotional
harm before conduct rises to the level of bullying.220
215. See supra Part I.B.
216. This may not be true across the board, but it is a correlate of the definition of employment,
which turns on an employer’s control over the employee’s work. See Matthew T. Bodie,
Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 661, 675 (2013) (“The ‘control’
test is the dominant standard for employment, both nationally and internationally.”).
217. See Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace
Protections, 86 IND. L.J. 1219, 1230 (2011) (discussing the limits of U.S. law in intervening in
harassment aside from sexual harassment).
218. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65–67 (1986) (racially or sexually
hostile work environment arises only when the conduct is “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter
the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment’” (quoting Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982))). See infra Part II.4 for further discussion of
discrimination and sexual harassment law.
219. See Clarke, supra note 217, at 1231 (collecting foreign legislation).
220. For example, Quebec’s labor code bans “psychological harassment,” defined as “vexatious
behaviour in the form of repeated and hostile or unwanted conduct . . . that affects an employee’s
dignity or psychological or physical integrity and that results in a harmful work environment for the
employee.” Act Respecting Labour Standards, R.S.Q. 2014, c. N-1.1, ch. IV, div. V.2, § 81.18 ¶ 1
(Que., Can.).
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Workers’ Compensation

Nor does workers’ compensation—the law meant to remedy
workplace injuries—adequately remedy the vulnerability to the
emotional harms that can result from exposure. Workers’ compensation
does recognize a small set of “extraordinary” instances of particularly
trying intimate work and allows such intimate workers to recover for
injuries that result from it.221 But, again, this law is too narrow to protect
all intimate workers. For the vast majority of intimate work, courts tend
to deny recovery on the theory that emotional exposure is just part of the
job.222 Otherwise, the only protection against emotional harm afforded to
intimate workers is the one provided to everyone in the form of tort law,
which is reserved for egregious behavior.223 Despite the unique
circumstances of intimate work, then, intimate workers are afforded little
remedy for the harms their work can inflict.

E.

Lost Investments

The development of intimacy typically requires investments in the
relationship.224 The information exchange that develops between the
intimate worker and consumer reduces the search for alternative partners
because getting to know someone is costly.225 Norms of altruism and
reciprocity too become more valuable over time.226 The “longer the
221. See, e.g., Smith-Price v. Charter Pines Behavioral Ctr., 584 S.E.2d 881 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003)
(allowing recovery for psychiatric nurse who suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder where job
required treating suicidal patients and treatment errors could result in death).
222. See, e.g., Anthony v. Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Family Servs., 548 S.E.2d 273 (Va. Ct. App.
2001) (denying recovery to social worker because confrontations with angry parents, including
being pulled from her chair and thrown out of a house and being pushed off a porch, were not
unusual occurrences for a social worker); Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ill., 523 N.E.2d
912, 917 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (categorically denying recovery for mental distress arising from
repeated stressful interactions with consumers because this would “open a floodgate for workers
who succumb to the everyday pressures of life”).
223. See, e.g., Hollomon v. Keadle, 931 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Ark. 1996) (requiring a showing of
“extreme and outrageous” conduct that it is “utterly intolerable in a civilized community” to
establish the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress).
224. See James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. SOC. REV.
95, 98, 100–03 (1988); Seibert, supra note 72, at 222.
225. Uzzi, supra note 14, at 681 (explaining that the sharing of private information “in turn
causes [individuals] to reduce their search for alternative information sources or exchange partners”
because, inter alia, “the acquisition of information is costly,” and “thus, the more time devoted to
information transfer with one party, the less time available for other ties”).
226. See id. at 680–81 (discussing process by which trust develops between workers and
consumers such that over time “economic exchange becomes embedded in a multiplex relationship
composed of economic investments, friendship, and altruistic attachments”); cf. Naomi
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[intimate work] relationship lasts the richer it becomes in debits and
credits, creating an opportunity-rich social structure.”227 Because the
value of intimate work derives from relationship-specific investments, it
is largely lost when the intimate work relationship ends, either through
termination or reassignment of the worker, or the worker or consumer’s
departure.228
Intimate work relationships can persist and still retain some of their
value even when intimate workers and consumers are no longer working
together.229 But rupturing the work relationship vastly reduces the value,
and in particular, robs it of the unique features that make intimate work
ties so valuable. The separation of the tie from work will tend to reduce
the benefits derived from intimacy specifically found at work. Because
the relationship is separated from an ongoing work relationship, the
relationship will be less capable of supporting the intimate worker in her
productive capacity. The consumer cannot communicate the same types
of valuable information or provide on-the-spot support. And the
separation of the tie from work will tend to reduce its intimacy. It is the
regular interaction that work almost uniquely affords that helps to
generate and maintain intimacy.230 If the separation of the relationship
from work also involves a geographical move, this only further reduces
valuable intimacy.231
Despite the value of these intimate work relationships, work law
leaves intimate workers and consumers perpetually vulnerable to these
relationships being ruptured. Here, there is a law of intimate work that
recognizes the bonds between intimate workers and consumers, but it is
far too narrow. For most intimate workers, work law treats intimate work
too much like all other work by affording far too little significance to the
Schoenbaum, Mobility Measures, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1169, 1199 (explaining how developing strong
bonds requires making investments over time).
227. Uzzi, supra note 14, at 678 (explaining that “the identity of the individuals and the quality of
their social ties are as important as the information itself,” and thus that without trusted information
sources, the information itself is far less valuable).
228. See RONALD S. BURT, STRUCTURAL HOLES: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF COMPETITION 9
(1992) (noting that “the connection, with whatever social [intimate] capital it contained, dissolves”
and that “[i]f a firm treats a cluster of customers poorly and they leave, the social [intimate] capital
represented by the firm-cluster relationship is lost”); Donald P. Moynihan & Sanjay K. Pandey, The
Ties That Bind: Social Networks, Person-Organization Value Fit, and Turnover Intention, 18 J.
PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 205, 210–11 (2007) (“Employees exiting an organization will lose the
potential to use the carefully cultivated social [intimate] capital they have built.”); Schoenbaum,
supra note 226, at 1207–15.
229. See Schoenbaum, supra note 226, at 1206–07 (focusing on coworkers).
230. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text.
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relationship between the worker and the consumer and treating it as
fungible. In this way, work law undermines the relational and emotional
components of production that are integral to intimate work.

1.

Non-Compete Agreements

Non-compete agreements limit workers’ ability to leave a firm and
start a competing business or work for a competitor. Unlike most
contracts, courts scrutinize these agreements because they limit the
freedom to work and can restrain trade.232 Most jurisdictions uphold noncompete agreements so long as they are reasonably limited in scope
(geographic and durational) and purpose.233 In a few cases, the law of
employee mobility does recognize intimate work. Traditionally, courts
have scrutinized covenants not to compete for doctors and lawyers more
carefully on the basis of the special nature of the relationship between
these professionals and their customers.234 For other intimate workers,
though, courts pay little heed to intimate work relationships and their
value to both the worker and the consumer.
In determining the validity of a covenant not to compete, courts look
to whether the hardship to the worker or injury to the public outweighs
the employer’s need to protect its legitimate interests.235 In determining
injury to the public, courts assess whether the intimate worker’s services
were “unique [or] uncommon.”236 When the services provided by the
intimate worker are available elsewhere in the area, courts see no harm
in barring access to a particular worker.237 The law here regards the
service provided to be the only thing of value. The unique supportive
value of these relationships, the investments made in them, and how
these investments can enhance the value of the service provided are not
considered.
232. See Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 539 (Wyo. 1993).
233. Michael Selmi, The Restatement’s Supersized Duty of Loyalty, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y
J. 101, 101–02 (2012).
234. See Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277 (Ariz. 1999) (invalidating doctor’s
restrictive covenant because it interferes with the doctor-patient relationship); Cohen v. Lord, Day &
Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that restrictive covenants among attorneys are
prohibited on the basis of the lawyer-client relationship). Some courts have become more permissive
in upholding these covenants against doctors so long as the community is not deprived of important
medical services, but courts still scrutinize these agreements more closely than those for other
intimate workers. See Mohanty v. St. John Heart Clinic, S.C., 866 N.E.2d 85 (Ill. 2006).
235. See Hopper, 861 P.2d at 539–40; A.E.P. Indus., Inc. v. McClure, 302 S.E.2d 754, 760 (N.C.
1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1981).
236. Hopper, 861 P.2d at 544.
237. Id.
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In determining hardship to the worker, courts assess whether she can
practice her chosen profession. So long as the worker can continue
plying her trade, courts deny that restricted access to particular
consumers causes any hardship to the worker.238 This analysis regards
intimate work as simply the provision of services, with the recipients of
those services being interchangeable. This ignores the personal and
professional value embedded in intimate work relationships. And
intimate work provides yet another reason for courts to scrutinize noncompete agreements. Because intimate workers tend to be myopic both
about the extent of intimacy they develop with consumers and the
duration of the employment relationship, they do not reach optimal
contractual arrangements at the outset of employment relationships.239
Courts do consider the employer’s loss of customers as a reason for
upholding a restrictive covenant.240 In fact, some courts even rely on
customers’ “close” and “personal relationships” with, and “love” for, an
intimate worker as a reason to enforce a non-compete agreement;
otherwise, this intimacy could result in the employer’s loss of
customers.241 While an employer’s investment in creating the necessary
conditions for intimate work relationships is a relevant consideration in
assessing the validity of a non-compete agreement, it should not be to
the exclusion of the intimate worker-consumer relationship.
Defenders of current law might argue that the employer rightly owns
the value of customer relationships generated by intimate work, because
these relationships would not exist but for the employer selling the
intimate worker’s services. But research on intimate work shows the
importance of worker-consumer bonds for firm loyalty. Management
literature on customer-firm loyalty has disaggregated customer relations
with workers and with firms and has found that customer relations with
workers, particularly intimate workers, drive customers’ loyalty to

238. See, e.g., id. at 543 (enforcing covenant that barred veterinarian from practicing small animal
medicine because she could still practice large animal medicine); Mayne v. O’Bannon Pub. Co., No.
31A05–1301–CT–5, 990 N.E.2d 525 (table), 2013 WL 3787601, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. July 17, 2013)
(enforcing five-year non-compete agreement against manager with close relationships with
customers); Zona Corp. v. McKinnon, No. PLCV201100247, 2011 WL 1663094 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Mar. 14, 2011) (enforcing non-compete against hairstylist).
239. See infra Part III.A.2 for further explication of contracting and information deficits in the
context of intimate work.
240. See Philip G. Johnson & Co. v. Salmen, 317 N.W.2d 900, 904 (Neb. 1982) (enumerating
employer’s loss of customers as a factor weighing in favor of enforcing non-compete agreement).
241. Mayne, 2013 WL 3787601, at *3 (enforcing non-compete because manager “was the face
of” the employer, “she knew the customers and their printing needs well,” and they “loved” her).
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firms.242 In the intimate work context, “customers develop loyalty to a
[firm] because of their loyalty to [workers],” who “function as prominent
firm agents and whose performance represents a key characteristic of the
service.”243
This research highlights the fiction of the agency relationship in the
context of intimate work. That is, consumers develop relationships with
the agent (the intimate worker) that is quite distinct from their
relationships with the principal (the employer). Recognizing intimate
work requires recognizing that the delegation from the principal (the
employer) to the agent (the intimate worker) means that when the
intimate worker acts on behalf of the employer, she is not fungible.
Rather, the agent comes to stand in for the principal in ways that
overtake the role of the principal. Given the significance of intimate
work relationships to both consumers and workers, the law’s failure to
appreciate this imposes significant harms.
The law’s cramped recognition of intimate work relationships—only
in the context of doctors and lawyers—is far too narrow to protect the
value of intimate work relationships. The worker can start a competing
business only in another location without her intimate ties or after time
has passed and the ties have weakened. This is especially concerning in
light of the rise in employers’ reliance on non-compete agreements,244
including as applied to a range of intimate workers.245

242. See Yim et al., supra note 74, at 746, 750, 752–53 (finding that loyalty relationships between
workers and customers transfer to the firm for relational/intimate services (hair salon) but not
transactional services (fast food)); see also Neeli Bendapudi & Robert P. Leone, Managing
Business-to-Business Customer Relationships Following Key Contact Employee Turnover in a
Vendor Firm, 66 J. MARKETING 83, 83–84 (2002) (collecting studies finding that in many cases, a
customer’s relationship with an employee who is closest to them is stronger than the customer’s
relationship with the firm; that these relationships result in positive emotional ties and customer
loyalty to the firm; and that intimacy between customer and worker strengthens these relationships);
Robert W. Palmatier et al., Customer Loyalty to Whom? Managing the Benefits and Risks of
Salesperson-Owned Loyalty, 44 J. MARKETING RES. 185, 185 (2007) (developing the concept of
salesperson-owned loyalty—“fealty directed specifically toward an individual salesperson
independent of his or her affiliation with the selling firm”—and finding that while customer loyalty
to the worker and the firm both contribute to a customer’s willingness to pay a price premium, only
customer loyalty to the worker contributes to sales growth and selling effectiveness);
243. Yim et al., supra note 74, at 752–53 (finding such in context of hair salon).
244. Viva R. Moffatt, The Wrong Tool for the Job: The IP Problem Within Noncompetition
Agreements, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 873, 876 (2010); Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling
Persistence of Unenforceable Contract Terms, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1149 (2009).
245. See Steven Greenhouse, Noncompete Clauses Increasingly Pop Up in an Array of Jobs, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 2014, at B1 (documenting how restrictive covenants, once largely limited to the
technology and sales sectors, are entering a range of fields, including those involving intimate work,
such as camp counselors and hairstylists).
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Of course, non-compete agreements might be seen as recognizing the
value of intimate work ties from the perspective of the employer, who is
seeking to maintain ties between the intimate worker and her consumers
by keeping the worker in place. But the employer could protect these
intimate work relationships with a fixed-term contract or through nonlegal mechanisms that enhance loyalty.246 A covenant not to compete
does not guarantee that the intimate worker remains with her current
employer, but does limit the worker (and her consumers) from retaining
intimate work relationships when starting a competing business.

2.

Duty of Loyalty

Likewise, the duty of loyalty bars employees who contemplate
starting competing businesses from soliciting customers while still
employed.247 The law generally distinguishes between announcing the
competing business and soliciting customers, permitting the former but
not the latter.248 In so doing, work law fails to afford intimate workers
the opportunity of meaningfully planning their professional trajectories.
Given the significance of particular intimate work relationships to
intimate workers, the success of the new business, and even the intimate
worker’s desire to start it, may turn on whether her established
relationships will follow her. Realistically assessing the prospect that
customers will follow the intimate worker to her new business will likely
involve the intimate worker crossing the line from announcing to
soliciting. Despite the significance of intimate work relationships, courts
have presumed that any contact initiated by the intimate worker to the
consumer is solicitation.249 So an intimate worker who attempts to
maintain just the intimate side of the relationship risks running afoul of
the duty to her employer.
This orientation of work law misconstrues the loyalty of both the
intimate worker and the consumer as directed to the employer rather than
to each other. As for the worker, prioritizing loyalty to her employer
ahead of loyalty to her consumers not only wrongly casts the employer-

246. See Marion Crain, Managing Identity: Buying into the Brand at Work, 95 IOWA L. REV.
1179, 1200–18 (2010), for a discussion of the variety of legal and non-legal mechanisms employers
use to cultivate employee loyalty.
247. See Selmi, supra note 233, at 103.
248. See id.
249. See Zona Corp. v. McKinnon, No. PLCV201100247, 2011 WL 1663094 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Mar. 14, 2011).
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employee relationship in the old mold of master-servant law,250 but fails
to recognize how the intimate worker-consumer relationship can be just
as, if not more, significant than the one between the worker and the
employer.251 Likewise, prioritizing the consumer’s relationship with the
employer over the relationship with the intimate worker fails to
recognize that customer loyalty is driven more by bonds with the
intimate worker than with the employer.252

3.

Trade Secrets

The law of unfair competition and trade secrets similarly fails to
appreciate the significance of intimate work. Trade secret law may
protect customer lists if the identity of customers is kept sufficiently
confidential.253 Once customer identity is a trade secret, former
employees are not allowed to use these customer lists for their own
advantage.254 In assessing whether customer lists, and thus the
development of customer relationships, are subject to trade secret
protection, courts often look to the employer’s efforts in developing
these customer relationships.255 Courts view these efforts as leading to
250. See generally JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW
(1983) (arguing that the whole of work law, including the duty of loyalty, continues to rely on a
view of employment premised in master-servant relations).
251. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing how relationships with consumers can
be more important than wages for intimate workers).
252. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
253. See, e.g., Dicks v. Jensen, 768 A.2d 1279, 1282 (Vt. 2001) (requiring that a trade secret:
“(A) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to,
and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use; and (B) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy” and noting that forty-one states use the same standard).
254. A minority of courts allow employees to rely on information retained by memory or
interaction with customers. See K.H. Larsen, Former Employee’s Duty, in Absence of Express
Contract, Not to Solicit Former Employer’s Customers or Otherwise Use His Knowledge of
Customer Lists Acquired in Earlier Employment, 28 A.L.R.3d 7 (2015) (“While a number of cases
have approved a former employee’s use of his knowledge of customers with whom he dealt in a
previous employment, only a few cases appear to treat the former employee’s right to use
memorized information in competition with his former employer as an absolute or unqualified
right.”). Compare Movie Gallery U.S. v. Greenshields, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1265 (M.D. Ala.
2009) (“While . . . detailed customer lists are properly viewed as trade secrets, a salesperson’s builtup goodwill and relationships are not,” and thus “individual, customer-by-customer information is
not properly considered a trade secret.”), with Calisi v. Unified Fin. Servs., 302 P.3d 628 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2013) (holding that confidentiality determines trade secret protection, regardless whether
employee memorized information), and Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 282 N.E.2d 921 (Mass.
1972) (same).
255. In addition to being sufficiently secret, a trade secret must derive value from not being
“readily ascertainable” to competitors. How much effort the employer put in to developing the
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the employer’s rightful ownership of these relationships.256
The law fails to consider the significance of the intimate workerconsumer relationship in developing and maintaining the consumer’s
relationship with the firm, even when the employer was initially
responsible for identifying the consumer. Research shows that it is more
likely the intimate worker’s efforts—and not the employer’s—that
secures an intimate consumer’s loyalty.257 So while the employer may
have initially gotten the customer on board with the company, it is the
intimate worker who kept her there. For example, contrary to the results
of one case, the relationship between an intimate worker who cleaned a
customer’s home may be just as, if not more, responsible for the
consumer’s ongoing use of the firm than the phone call that initiated the
consumer’s contact with the firm.258 The law denies the significance of
the intimate worker role, and downplays evidence that consumers want
to maintain relationships with intimate workers, not employers.259 This
leaves the intimate worker and the consumer with the ability to continue
the intimate work relationship only on pain of litigation.

4.

Termination and Transfer

Beyond employee mobility, work law also provides remedies for
termination and unemployment. But these remedies fail to include the
value lost when intimate work relationships are ruptured. As for
remedies upon termination, unemployment insurance (UI) provides
partial wage replacement,260 but nothing for the loss of intimate work
ties. Cash is a poor remedy, as relationships cannot simply be bought on
the market.261 Other than the experience rating of UI programs, which
serves as a mild disincentive to termination,262 work law plays little role

relationship speaks to whether the customers’ identity was “readily ascertainable.” Dicks, 768 A.2d
at 1282.
256. See, e.g., Town & Country House & Home Serv., Inc. v. Newberry, 147 N.E.2d 724, 727
(N.Y. 1958) (focusing on the employer house cleaning business’s efforts in identifying customers
through cold calling prospective customers from neighborhoods they thought might have demand).
257. See sources cited supra note 242.
258. Town & Country, 147 N.E.2d at 727.
259. Cupid Diaper Serv. v. Adelman, 211 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814–15 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (rejecting
evidence that customers wanted to continue service with intimate worker with whom they had an
established relationship).
260. See Gillian Lester, Unemployment Insurance and Wealth Redistribution, 49 UCLA L. REV.
335, 340 (2001).
261. See Schoenbaum, supra note 226, at 1215.
262. See Lester, supra note 260, at 341.
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in preventing or remedying the harms of lost intimate ties. Job training
programs address human capital factors that can make unemployment
difficult, but do little for the lost capital of ruptured intimate work ties.263
Even when the law provides relief for unlawful termination, the
remedies fail to recognize lost intimate work bonds. For example, Title
VII’s relief for discriminatory firings allows for compensatory damages
for both pecuniary and nonpecuniary harm, as well as injunctive relief
including reinstatement to “make [victims] whole.”264 But courts do not
account for lost intimate ties in fashioning a remedy for termination, or
in considering whether reinstatement is necessary to make the terminated
employee whole.265
The employer’s relocation or reassignment of intimate workers also
ruptures relationships between intimate workers and consumers. As
compared with termination, the law imposes even fewer protections
here.266 Aside from the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Act (WARN
Act),267 just about the only limit against such dislocations is a claim of
discrimination. But even then, work law does not recognize a cause of
action unless the transfer is accompanied by changes in the overtly
economic “terms and conditions of . . . employment,” such as salary or
benefits.268 Work law leaves those who lose intimate work relationships
263. See SEC’Y OF LABOR, ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND WORKER DISLOCATION IN A
COMPETITIVE SOCIETY 19 (1986).
264. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(2012) (providing that remedies for unlawful discrimination include “reinstatement or hiring of
employees, with or without back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate”); id. § 1981a(a)(1), (b)(3) (allowing compensatory damages, including “future
pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of
life, and other nonpecuniary losses”).
265. Many courts assessing whether reinstatement is a necessary remedy consider whether the
terminated employee has found comparable employment. See Brito v. Zia Co., 478 F.2d 1200 (10th
Cir. 1973); Greenbaum v. Svenska Handelsbanken, N.Y., 979 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). This
fails to recognize that the new workplace is not comparable in that it will almost certainly require
the loss of significant consumer relationships. Courts have even recognized intimate relationships
with consumers as a reason to reject reinstatement, when there is a concern that the employee’s
experience litigating with the employer will lead the employee to poison the employer’s
relationships with its customers. See EEOC v. Kallir, Philips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp 919, 927
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff’d without op., 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir. 1977).
266. See Schoenbaum, supra note 226, at 1169–70 (explaining how the WARN Act encourages
worker relocations without recognizing their significant costs).
267. 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (2012). The WARN Act, which applies to a small minority of employees,
requires covered employers to give notice of mass layoffs and relocations. See Schoenbaum, supra
note 226, at 1169–70.
268. Brennan v. Tractor Supply Co., 237 F. App’x 9, 23–24 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Kocsis v.
Multi-care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 855 (6th Cir. 1996)); see also Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc.,
487 F.3d 208, 219 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 253, 256–57 (4th Cir. 1999))
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as a result of discrimination without a remedy.
Critics might argue that considering lost relationships is inconsistent
with employment law, which is premised in economic rewards, and not
emotional ones.269 But intimate work fundamentally challenges the view
that work is simply about dollars and cents, rather than also about
personal relationships, both for their intrinsic rewards and their role in
productivity.270 Even if we accept this broader notion of the rewards of
work, we might still be concerned about adding relational considerations
to these employment law doctrines because of the judicial administration
problems associated with tricky line-drawing questions (e.g., when
intimate work relationships are close enough to warrant protection).
While an approach that requires distinguishing between different types
of worker-customer relationships is undoubtedly more burdensome than
simply distinguishing between family and non-family relationships, the
additional cost is warranted given the benefits that it brings.271 I return to
how to address these difficult line-drawing questions in the next Part.272

III.

THEORIZING A NEW LAW OF INTIMATE WORK

The shortcomings of the current ad hoc approach of intimate work
law naturally lead to the question of what, if anything, lawmakers should
do in response. This Article argues for a unified field of intimate work
law that would recognize the significance of the intimate workerconsumer relationship and the need to protect the value and guard
against the vulnerability that the relationship generates. A law that
recognizes the intersection of intimacy and work would not only enhance
the value and minimize the vulnerability that intimate work produces,
but would bring jurisprudential benefits to the fields of family law and
work law by remedying their categorical regulation of intimacy and

(holding that reassignment to selling houses in blighted neighborhood was not an adverse
employment action because “absent any decrease in compensation, job title, level of responsibility,
or opportunity for promotion,” the adverse economic consequences were too speculative).
269. Cf. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV. 225,
227–28 (2013) (noting that scholars typically conceive of the goal of employment law to be
economic efficiency or rectifying imbalances of bargaining power between employer and
employee).
270. See supra Part I.B.
271. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 174 (2011) (acknowledging “difficult
line-drawing problems concerning the types of relationships entitled to protection” in evaluating
retaliation against third-parties under Title VII, but explaining that such a concern fails to “justif[y]
a categorical rule that third-party reprisals do not violate Title VII”).
272. See infra Part III.B.1.d.
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work, which has been repeatedly critiqued, particularly as harmful to
women. Once the conceptual intimacy-work divide is bridged, such a
law could be implemented rather easily. In fact, the law can largely
proceed incrementally, with analogical adaptation of time-proven
doctrines to the circumstances of intimate work. This Part begins with a
consideration of why law—and, in particular, why a unified law of
intimate work—is needed, and then turns to a discussion of how to
implement this new field of intimate work law.

A.

Why Law

Before delving into the details of the new law this Article proposes, a
discussion of why this law is needed is in order. First, legal recognition
of intimate work would not only ameliorate the harms of current
regulation, but would begin to break down the categorical regulation of
intimacy and work, generating a law that better reflects the reality of our
lives, with benefits for gender equality. Second, market failures and a
reduction in employee bargaining power in the context of intimate work
render private ordering inadequate to maximize welfare, requiring the
injection of law.

1.

The Benefits of Law

Part II set forth the harms of the current law of intimate work: that
meaningful intimate work relationships will be tainted by discrimination;
that intimate workers will be undercompensated and even disciplined for
the altruism their work entails; that intimate workers will be exposed to
excessive emotional harm; and that intimate workers and consumers will
lose the value of substantial investments in these relationships. A new
law of intimate work would enhance the welfare of intimate workers and
the public as their consumers by remedying these harms. The next Part
addresses why private ordering fails to maximize welfare, and law is
needed to achieve this goal.
Before addressing these market failures, the broader benefits of a law
of intimate work that would consistently recognize the intersection of
intimacy and work and the value and vulnerability it produces deserve an
airing. The benefits of a unified field of intimate work law can be
glimpsed more easily when this Article is situated within an emerging
body of scholarship—what I call “the new intimacy” scholarship—
challenging the law’s special treatment of intimacy. Two strands of
scholarship are most prominent here. First, scholars have highlighted the
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ways in which the family is treated separately from the market. 273 These
scholars have documented the harms that flow from failing to apply the
rules of the market to the family, including the law’s failure to
compensate work done in the context of family, such as housework274
and surrogacy,275 and the law’s acceptance of discrimination in the
family.276 Second, scholars have highlighted the ways in which the law
treats the family as the exclusive repository for the rights and privileges
associated with intimacy, and fails to recognize or beneficially regulate
intimacy outside the family.277
These new intimacy scholars have explored how the categorical
recognition of intimacy and work fails to reflect reality and undermines
intimate relationships278 and work,279 which can both go unrecognized
under this regime.280 These scholars have also argued that the law’s
current regulation of intimate settings harms women, who do more of the
intimate family work that is not compensated, and who historically have
been disadvantaged in the marital relationship, and thus stand to gain
from the recognition of relationships based in other forms of intimacy. 281
This Article extends and deepens the critiques of the new intimacy
scholarship by exposing the harms that flow from the law’s failure to
recognize the intersection of intimacy and work in the form of intimate
work. In addition to ameliorating the harms delineated in Part II,
recognizing intimacy in the context of work allows for an alternative
model of intimacy with special benefits, including the promotion of

273. See generally Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law:
Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753,
753 (2011) (introducing and exploring “family law exceptionalism”); Olsen, supra note 29
(highlighting legal separation of family and market).
274. See Silbaugh, supra note 9, at 28–67.
275. See Hasday, supra note 29, at 513–15.
276. See generally Emens, supra note 29, at 1315–18 (highlighting acceptance of discrimination
in dating and marriage).
277. See generally Murray, supra note 29, at 387 (highlighting how family law ignores extended
family members and other non-family caregivers); Rosenbury, supra note 29, at 191 (highlighting
how family law ignores non-domestic support, especially friendship).
278. See, e.g., Rosenbury, supra note 29, at 212–20 (privileging marriage undermines friendship).
279. See, e.g., Silbaugh, supra note 9, at 28–67 (documenting how law regulating the family fails
to recognize work done in the context of intimacy).
280. See, e.g., id. at 84–85 (failing to compensate housework undermines this work).
281. See generally Hasday, supra note 29, at 517–22 (failing to recognize economic exchange in
intimate relations reinforces women’s dependence); Rosenbury, supra note 29, at 212–20 (arguing
that privileging marriage and ignoring other forms of support reinforces hierarchical gender
dynamics of marriage); Silbaugh, supra note 9, at 14–15 (failing to require payment for work in
family harms women, who do most of this work).
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gender equality.
Intimate work is uniquely valuable because it differs from family or
family-like intimacy.282 The all-consuming model of family intimacy
tends to disproportionately burden women.283 Legal recognition of an
alternative model of less demanding intimacy can then bring more
equality to the law of intimate relationships. Intimate work’s position in
the regulated context of work makes it easier, as compared with the more
private context of the family,284 to guard against the vulnerability to
sacrifice and exposure that tend to arise when intimacy is present. The
legal recognition of intimate work also allows meaningful intimacy to
flourish in a context in which equality in the formation of intimacy can
be promoted.285
A comprehensive field of intimate work law also holds the promise of
dissolving the legal categories of intimacy and work to create a more
fluid notion of both, within and without the family. A law that
recognizes the overlap of intimacy and work would further the new
intimacy law’s project of protecting and valuing intimacy even when it
arises outside the family, and protecting and valuing work even when it
arises outside the market. Dissolving the categories of intimacy and
work is important not only for protecting and compensating those who
engage in this type of extra-categorical intimacy and work, but also for
gender equality. As noted above, it is women who are disproportionately
harmed by the failure to recognize intimacy outside of the family and the
failure to recognize work outside the market.286
Valuing intimacy in the context of work would be a step toward
valuing the relational and the feminine within the market, and another
step toward gender equality. Relationships have long been aligned with
the feminine in the masculine-feminine binary.287 To the extent law
continues to undervalue the relational aspects of work, law continues to
undermine feminine traits as integral to market success.288 While
282. See supra Part I.A.
283. See supra Part I.A; Rosenbury, supra note 38, at 139–41 (arguing that support provided
disproportionately by workers of certain identities is an important axis for employment
antidiscrimination law to interrogate).
284. See Naomi R. Cahn, Models of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1225 (1998).
285. See supra Part I.A.
286. See sources cited supra note 281.
287. See Olsen, supra note 29, at 1499–1501.
288. Scholars have recognized the importance of relationships for contracting, business, and
corporate settings, but curiously this has not been extended to intimate relationships. See Margaret
M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247
(1999) (setting forth a relational theory of the corporation); Stewart Macauley, Non-Contractual
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relational traits can be found in both men and women, the devaluing of a
trait typically associated with women will tend to disproportionately
burden women.289 Moreover, while it is difficult to quantify, the best
evidence available suggests that women do more intimate work than men
and thus are disproportionately burdened by the harms that flow from the
law’s current shortcomings.290
Valuing work in the context of intimacy might also have a beneficial
impact on weakening the divide between work and intimacy in the
family. As referenced above, feminist legal scholars have long critiqued
the law’s failure to recognize housework and childcare for its
disproportionately harmful impact on women.291 Recognizing that
intimacy and work can overlap in the market and thus that meaningful
intimacy arises at work could further the project of recognizing that
intimacy and work can overlap in the family and that meaningful work
can be done there.
The regulation of intimate work within the preexisting regulatory
structure of work aids in ensuring that the recognition of intimacy is in a
form that preserves its unique benefits. One of the challenges of
expanding the legal recognition of non-family intimates is how to do so
without simply grafting the family model on to them. 292 Applying
regulation from the family realm to intimate work relationships risks
burdening these relationships in a way that undermines their special
benefits. Intimate work’s situation within the already regulated world of
work provides an alternative institutional structure through which to
recognize (and regulate) these relationships without simply relying on
family or family-like structures.
So far I have focused on the benefits of legal recognition of intimate
work. Of course, these benefits would only be achieved with regulation
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (1963) (setting forth importance of
trust in business dealings); Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 NW. U. L.
REV. 340 (1983) (setting forth theory of relational contracts).
289. This is the type of disparate impact gender discrimination—disfavoring a trait associated
with one sex more than another—that Mary Anne Case argued to be troubling, and potentially in
violation of employment antidiscrimination law, in her seminal article on gendered traits and
employment discrimination. See Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual
Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 34
(1995) (describing how the devaluing of the feminine, in men or women, will accrue to the
disadvantage of women).
290. See, e.g., Rachel E. Dwyer, The Care Economy? Gender, Economic Restructuring, and Job
Polarization in the U.S. Labor Market, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 390, 392 (2013); England, supra note
165, at 383.
291. See, e.g., Silbaugh, supra note 9, at 72.
292. See ETHAN J. LEIB, FRIEND V. FRIEND 78–108 (2011); Rosenbury, supra note 29, at 226–33.
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that was sensitive to these goals, a challenge taken up in the next Part.
Before doing so, it is important to clear the way of the most significant
challenges to the reliance on law.

2.

Objections and Responses

Some might object that injecting law here would interfere with liberty
or otherwise undermine the freedom that beneficially distinguishes
intimate work relationships from those of the family. As an initial
matter, objecting to the injection of law here is a bit of a red herring. As
Part II revealed, some intimate work relationships are already highly
regulated.
More fundamentally, contrary to the concerns of libertarians, the law
proposed here should make intimate workers and consumers more free in
their relationships, not less. The primary concern with regulation
interfering with liberty is the state flexing its coercive muscle vis-à-vis
private parties in a way that interferes with individual choice.293 But in
the work context, there is another party—the employer—who holds
significant coercive power over the worker.294 The bulk of the argument
in Part II was meant to reveal how the current law of intimate work
leaves employers with too much liberty to reign in the freedom of
workers and consumers to form and maintain meaningful intimate work
relationships. The aim of a comprehensive field of intimate work law
would be to constrain employers from undermining the value or
heightening the vulnerability of intimate workers and consumers. The
law would impose little in the way of affirmative obligations for workers
or consumers that run the risk of burden or coercion, but instead would
leave the parties freer to navigate the intimate work relationship without
employer interference in the formation and rupture of these bonds.
Employers properly bear this burden because they promote and
benefit from intimate work. For work that requires intimacy, such as
nursing, childcare work, or therapy, the employer relies on and benefits
from intimacy between the worker and the consumer. Even when
intimacy is not inherent to the job, employers promote intimate work.
Management literature advises employers to use intimacy as a tool of
production that increases employee loyalty without requiring a reciprocal

293. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2700–01
(2008).
294. See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL.
SCI. Q. 470 (1923).
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commitment of job security from the firm.295
These intimacy strategies are particularly important in the service
economy. For many service jobs, the quality of interaction between the
worker and the consumer is part of the service delivered, and intimacy
often enhances this interaction.296 In response, employers sort for the
intimate type—workers who will bring family values to work and
develop ties with customers.297 Employers also require workers to forge
bonds with customers and learn intimate details about them so as to
better meet their needs.298 For the service worker, “inhabiting the job
means, at the very least, pretending to like it, and, at most, actually
bringing his whole self into the job, liking it, and genuinely caring about
the people with whom he interacts.”299 In the service economy,
“emotional availability can no longer be dismissed as women’s work; it
must be seen as a dominant commodity form under late capitalism.”300
Placing some of the burden of intimate work on employers does raise
a key concern. It makes intimate work more costly for employers,
providing an incentive for employers to avoid or reduce the intimacy of
work, contrary to current practices. Given the need for and benefits of
intimacy, as evidenced by its prevalence throughout the market, the lack
of available substitutes, and the relatively modest burdens imposed by
the interventions proposed here, an anti-intimacy reaction would be
unlikely.301

295. See Peter Cappelli, Rethinking Employment, 33 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 563 (1995).
296. See Leidner, supra note 14, at 83.
297. This can be a crucial signal of the “good type” of intimate worker that the employer desires.
See Spence, supra note 108, at 356–61.
298. See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD, supra note 60, at 7, 105 (documenting how flight attendants were
instructed to imagine that customers were guests in their living room); Wharton, supra note 14, at
156 (“[E]mployers enforce display rules because they assume that workers’ compliance with them is
beneficial for the organization.”). In industries as varied as hospitality and healthcare, workers use
technology “to instantly call-up a range and depth of information on customers to allow them to
‘make encounters feel more personal.’” Marek Korczynski, Understanding Contradictions Within
the Lived Experience of Service Workers: The Customer-Oriented Bureaucracy, in SERVICE WORK:
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 93, at 73, 82; see also Crain, supra note 246, at 1183 n.5.
299. Cameron Lynne Macdonald & Carmen Sirianni, The Service Society and the Changing
Experience of Work, in WORKING IN THE SERVICE SOCIETY 1, 4 (Cameron Lynne Macdonald &
Carmen Sirianni eds., 1996).
300. Paul Myerscough, Short Cuts, LONDON REV. BOOKS, Jan. 3, 2013, at 25; see also Noah,
supra note 11.
301. See ZELIZER, supra note 62, at 250–55 (documenting the extensive findings of natural
intimacy across many different types of work over time).
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The Inadequacy of Private Ordering

Beyond the benefits of law, intimate workers and consumers need law
because intimacy undermines the ability to maximize welfare through
private ordering. Law is a backstop for protecting workers when exit and
voice and other market mechanisms fall short.302 Lopsided bargaining
power that tends to favor employers often limits workers’ ability to
utilize exit and voice. But because of what transpires when intimacy
meets work, intimate workers’ ability to rely on exit and voice to protect
the value and remedy the vulnerability of intimate work is reduced.
Moreover, market failures in the context of intimate work render private
bargaining inefficient. This means that intimate workers cannot reliably
lean on self-help and need a law of intimate work.

a.

Exit and Voice

Exit is the ability of the worker to end the employment relationship
(which employees generally can under employment-at-will). Exit and its
threat confer leverage on the worker.303 Voice is the ability of workers to
request desired terms and conditions of work from their employers.304
Workers rely on voice through informal requests and other mechanisms
of feedback, as well as a few legal protections that rely on voice.305
Many workers are already limited in the effective use of exit and voice
as protective mechanisms because dependence on their jobs renders
them unwilling or unable to (credibly) threaten exit or to exercise
voice.306
However effective exit and voice are in the context of work, there is
reason to believe that they are even less effective in the context of
intimate work. When it comes to exit, research consistently finds that
close bonds at work reduce turnover.307 If employers need not worry so
302. I rely on the exit/voice framework from the seminal work on group behavior, ALBERT O.
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS,
AND STATES 1–5 (1970). Under this framework, members of an organization have two responses to
dissatisfaction with the organization—exit or voice—with loyalty to the organization mediating the
choice between the two. Id.
303. See Richard Freeman, The Exit-Voice Tradeoff in the Labor Market: Unionism, Job Tenure,
Quits, and Separations, 94 Q.J. ECON. 643, 643 (1980).
304. See James R. Detert & Amy C. Edmonson, Implicit Voice Theories: Taken-for-Granted
Rules of Self-Censorship at Work, 54 ACAD. MGMT. J. 461, 461 (2011).
305. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2014) (providing for an “interactive process” by which
disabled employees seek accommodations from employers).
306. See Hale, supra note 294, at 472–73.
307. See Terence R. Mitchell, Why People Stay: Using Job Embeddedness to Predict Voluntary
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much about intimate workers exiting for better conditions or pay, this
places less pressure on employers to better conditions or pay. This may
help to explain why care workers—a large subset of intimate workers—
systematically suffer a wage penalty.308
Intimate-worker voice is also muted by the combination of intimacy
and work. Intimate workers can become what one economist terms
“prisoners of love” due to their tendency to sacrifice for the benefit of
their consumers.309 Intimate workers may find themselves in
circumstances where their attachments to consumers make them less
likely to withhold services, demand higher wages, or otherwise seek
better terms of work if this would risk adverse effects on their
consumers.310 So while intimate work may sometimes lead intimate
workers to stand up to employers on behalf of their consumers,311 it may
also lead intimate workers to reduce voice about their own working
conditions. Just as a parent’s intimate relationship with her children can
hamper her ability to make credible threats about reducing care for or
abandoning her children, so too does an intimate worker’s intimate
relationship with her consumer hamper her ability to make credible
threats about reducing care for or abandoning her consumer.312 The felt
obligations of intimacy may lead workers to simply take their lumps
rather than complain.313

b.

Market Failures

Multiple barriers to efficient bargaining justify legal intervention in
the context of intimate work.314 Contractual arrangements are unlikely to
provide meaningful protection against lost intimate work relationships.
Any personal services contracts (i.e., a contract that an intimate worker
would stay with an employer) could not be specifically enforced,315 and
money damages are not an adequate substitute for lost ties.
Turnover, 44 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1102, 1105 (2001); Moynihan & Pandey, supra note 228, at 211–14.
308. See England, supra note 165, at 383 (collecting studies finding the pay penalty even after
controlling for education, skill, working conditions, and even sex composition).
309. Id. at 390.
310. Id.
311. See supra Part II.C.2.
312. England, supra note 165, at 390.
313. See Marks, supra note 48, at 855; Massengill, supra note 59, at 203.
314. See Christine Jolls, Employment Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1349,
1352–57 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
315. See Clayton P. Gillette, Tacit Agreement and Relationship-Specific Investment, 88 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 128, 147 (2013).
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More problematic than any barriers to enforcement is that these
contracts are unlikely to form in the first place. Workers are myopic and
overly optimistic about the terms of the employment relationship and
their legal protections against termination, making them unlikely to
foresee the need to bargain with either work intimates or their employer
for terms that are more protective of intimate ties.316 Moreover, many
workers are in too weak a bargaining position to negotiate successfully
for these terms from their employer.317
Information deficits may also lead to inadequate bargaining at the
formation of the employment relationship. Because it is the act of
engaging in intimate work over time that can shift workers’ preferences,
intimate workers may be unlikely to foresee the impact of intimacy at the
start of the employment relationship. The behaviors of intimate work are
at least partially endogenous to doing intimate work. Rather than
workers with preferences for intimate behaviors seeking out intimate
work, workers develop intimate behaviors by doing intimate work and
developing bonds with their consumers. “[C]hild care workers become
attached to the toddlers they see every day, nurses empathize with their
patients, and teachers worry about their students.”318 So just as workers
in jobs involving intellectual skills get smarter, workers in jobs involving
intimate skills get more intimate—they behave more intimately toward
those who receive their services.319
Even if some bargains could be struck, say, between an employer and
an employee, the consequences for consumers will not be adequately
accounted for in such bargains.320 Intimate work calls into question
standard economic assumptions about externalities—i.e., that rational
actors will only contract in their own interest. The problem here, though,
is that these contracts are typically bargained for at the outset of the
316. See Pauline Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of
Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 106 (1997) (empirically finding
that “workers appear to systematically overestimate the protections afforded by law, believing that
they have far greater rights against unjust or arbitrary discharges than they in fact have under an atwill contract”).
317. The prevalence of non-compete agreements, which we might think of as non-portability-ofintimate-capital contracts, could be seen as evidence of this. See sources cited supra notes 244–45.
318. See England, supra note 165, at 390.
319. Id.
320. Cf. Andrew Clark et al., Boon or Bane? Others’ Unemployment Well-Being and Job
Insecurity, 17 LABOUR ECON. 52, 53–54 (2010) (finding that aggregate unemployment based on the
strength of the regional labor market is a better predictor of a worker’s well-being than the current
employment status of that worker); Priti Pradhan Shah, Network Destruction: The Structural
Implications of Downsizing, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 101, 102 (2000) (finding that dismissal of a friend
is negatively related to a survivor’s centrality in a firm’s friendship and advice networks).

07 - Schoenbaum.docx (Do Not Delete)

1228

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

10/23/2015 12:48 PM

[Vol. 90:1167

relationship, and at this point intimate workers are suffering from the
information deficits and myopia just described.

B.

What Law

Once lawmakers move past the conceptual intimacy-work divide,
putting in place a unified field of intimate work law would not be such a
heavy lift. In most areas, courts could simply incorporate a functional
understanding of the impact of intimate work under current doctrines. In
a few areas, recognizing intimate work would require a more substantial
response—a change in doctrine or a statutory amendment. These two
mechanisms for implementing a new law of intimate work—functional
recognition and additional recognition—are discussed in turn below.

1.

Functional Recognition

A functional approach to intimate work requires courts to recognize
that meaningful intimacy arises not only in the family, but also at work,
and that intimacy in the provision of work services requires protection.321
Three types of functional adjustments would be required. First, the law
should expand recognition of intimate work in areas where it currently
recognizes intimate work but does so too narrowly. Second, the law
should initiate recognition of intimate work in areas where the law fails
to recognize the implications of intimate work and treats it just like other
work. Third, the law should reverse recognition of intimate work where
the law recognizes intimate work but treats it too much like the family
by subtracting rather than adding protection. These three types of
changes are discussed in turn below, followed by a discussion of the
principles that would guide their application.

a.

Expanding Recognition

In some instances, the law properly recognizes the value and
vulnerability of intimate work, but does so too narrowly, failing to
recognize its full range.322 In these cases, the law should expand its

321. For examples of and justification for a functional approach to recognizing relationships, see,
for example, Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who’s In and Who’s Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV.
269, 270–72 (1991); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families,
78 GEO. L.J. 459, 483–91 (1990); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Towards a Revitalization of Family
Law, 69 TEX. L. REV. 245, 279–80 (1990).
322. See supra Parts II.C.2 (retaliation); II.D.1 (fiduciary duties); II.E (non-compete agreements).
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recognition of intimate work.
Take the law of non-compete agreements, which strictly scrutinizes
such agreements involving doctors and lawyers to avoid lost intimate
work investments, but takes a far more lax approach toward other
intimate workers, despite the same value and vulnerability at stake.323
Here, the law could recognize intimate work by applying heightened
scrutiny to non-compete agreements across the whole category of
intimate work. This does not mean that non-compete agreements entered
into by intimate workers would never be enforceable. Rather, the
enforcement of these agreements is already subject to a balancing test
that takes into account the hardship to the worker, the injury to the
public, and the employer’s need to protect its legitimate interest.324
Recognizing intimate work would require courts to include the lost value
of intimate work relationships as a hardship to the worker and an injury
to the public for intimate workers beyond lawyers and doctors. This
would still be balanced against the employer’s legitimate interest, and
the latter might still trump. The balancing would of course depend on the
evidence presented in any particular case. While balancing such
incommensurate interests is undoubtedly a difficult undertaking, current
law already requires decision-makers to weigh incommensurate
interests—the interests of the worker, the public, and the employer.325
This revision would simply expand the universe of interests that must be
weighed in the mix. The law might also consider allowing consumers
who are affected by the enforcement of the agreement to intervene in the
suit.
Likewise, a functional approach to fiduciary duties could better
recognize intimate work. Currently, fiduciary recognition may be denied
if a relationship is viewed too much along the lines of a friendship
without sufficient dominance by one party over the other.326 Courts

323. See supra Part II.E.1.
324. See Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 539–40 (Wyo. 1993); A.E.P.
Indus., Inc. v. McClure, 302 S.E.2d 754, 760 (N.C. 1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 188 (1981).
325. See, e.g., Hopper, 861 P.2d at 540, 543–44 (in ruling on the enforceability of a non-compete
agreement, considering the interests of the employer (e.g., “the risk of the covenantee losing
customers” (quoting Philip G. Johnson & Co. v. Salmen, 317 N.W.2d 900, 904 (Neb. 1982))), the
interests of the employee (e.g., “the necessity of the covenantor changing his calling or residence”
(quoting id.)), and the interests of the public (e.g., whether the “public will . . . suffer injury from
enforcement of the covenant”)). On legal decisionmaking in the context of incommensurable values
more generally, see Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV.
779 (1994).
326. See supra Part II.D.1.
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should more broadly recognize, as some already have, that friendship
and the intimacy that accompanies it can co-exist with a work
relationship.327 The combination of intimacy and work render intimate
work relationships prime candidates for the application of fiduciary
duties. Relating in the realm of work means that intimate workers and
consumers often deal with pecuniary matters that can result in legally
cognizable injuries, and the intimacy of the relationship can heighten the
need for protection based on increased dependence and trust. This is easy
to see for duties running from the intimate worker to the consumer, but
the same can be true in reverse.328 Courts should also recognize that
these relationships can generate fiduciary duties running from consumers
to intimate workers.
While the application of fiduciary duties in the intimate work context
in factually appropriate circumstances may seem like a significant shift,
it is simply an application of a principle that is already applied in
multiple jurisdictions: when there is sufficient trust and dependence
between the parties, even without a dominant and subordinate party,
fiduciary duties should attach to protect the vulnerability that can arise
out of the misuse of information.329 Jurisdictions that have already
adopted such a principle, both in the context of intimate work and
outside of it, have not been overburdened by this broader understanding
of fiduciary duty.330
For other laws, recognizing the whole category of intimate work
requires grounding in a theory that better reflects the way that intimate
work changes the behavior of intimate workers. For example, recall that
collective action rights under the NLRA protect intimate workers who
complain of bad treatment of their consumers only when courts are
willing to read such complaints as motivated by intimate workers’ selfinterested economic gain.331 Work law instead should recognize that
because intimate workers come to care about their consumers, actions
taken to improve consumers’ welfare also improve intimate workers’
welfare. Therefore, intimate workers who exercise voice to improve
conditions for their consumers typically satisfy the mutuality
requirement for protection.

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

See Leib, supra note 205, at 707–09 (collecting cases).
See supra Part II.D.1.
See Frankel, supra note 197, at 809–10.
See supra notes 205–10; Lieb, supra note 197, at 702–07.
See supra Part II.C.2.
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Initial Recognition

In other instances, work law fails to recognize intimate work at all and
treats it just like all other work. In such cases, current doctrine could be
modified to appreciate the role of intimate work in intimate worker and
consumer behavior. For example, Title VII’s protection against
retaliation “prohibits any employer action that well might have
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
[discrimination] charge.”332 Recognizing intimate work in this context
would mean recognizing that among employer actions that would
dissuade a reasonable intimate worker from making or supporting a
discrimination charge would be retaliation against the intimate worker’s
consumers. Recall the earlier example of an employer who retaliates
against a camp counselor by worsening conditions for her campers.
This type of recognition would require courts to adopt a more fluid
understanding of intimacy and work instead of relying on existing legal
categories of workers and intimates.333 Recall the Supreme Court’s
decision in Thompson holding that an employer’s action against a
worker’s fiancé could fall within the scope of prohibited employer
action.334 Recognizing intimate work would mean extending protection
to acts against work intimates and not just family or family-like
intimates.
Thompson does hold promise as a model for the functional
recognition of intimate work not artificially limited by the legal
categories of work and family that could be extended to other areas of
work law. The Court suggested that retaliation protection would turn on
a fact-specific inquiry into the intimacy at stake in a particular case.335
While it continued to privilege family relationships,336 it “decline[d] to
identify a fixed class of relationships for which third-party reprisals are
unlawful,” leaving open the possibility that adverse action taken against
a “close friend” could constitute actionable harassment.337 Indeed, the
332. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 174 (2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
333. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing role of legal categories and in presumptions about behavior
in retaliation cases).
334. See Thompson, 562 U.S. at 174.
335. See id. at 174–75.
336. Id. at 175 (“We expect that firing a close family member will almost always meet the
Burlington standard . . . .”).
337. Id. at 174–75 (in response to a concern about extending protection to a “close friend,” stating
that “inflicting a milder reprisal on a mere acquaintance will almost never do so, but beyond that we
are reluctant to generalize” because “[g]iven the broad statutory text and the variety of workplace
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touchstone for relief was one based on a functional understanding of
how intimacy can affect work behavior: whether the allegedly retaliatory
action was the type that would have “dissuaded a reasonable worker
from engaging in protected activity.”338
Recognizing intimate work in the context of unlawful terminations
and transfers requires work law to appreciate how relationships with
consumers fundamentally determine the terms and conditions of work
for intimate workers.339 In the case of remedying unlawful terminations,
for example, appreciating the significance of intimate work relationships
for personal and professional support for intimate workers should lead
courts to consider whether reinstatement is necessary to make the worker
whole. The significance of intimate work bonds would not mandate
reinstatement, but would be weighed in the balance in considering the
appropriate remedy. For example, evidence that a terminated employee
was so embittered by the litigation process that she could not return as an
effective employee would weigh against reinstatement. If reinstatement
is not ordered, lost investments in intimate work relationships should be
valued and awarded to the intimate worker as damages.340
Other times, initiating recognition of intimate work requires revision
of the assumptions underlying a doctrine. This is so, for example, with
the duty of loyalty and trade secret protection.341 Both doctrines fail to
protect intimate workers and consumers on the assumption that
consumers are more bonded to businesses that offer services than to the
intimate workers who serve them.342 In cases of intimate work, courts
should consider evidence that the consumer’s relationship with the firm
may be driven more by bonds with the intimate worker than by the
employer’s efforts. Again, intimate workers would not always prevail,
but this evidence should be considered and weighed in the worker’s
favor.
In cases involving a duty of loyalty violation, work law should grant
intimate workers more leeway to plan their career trajectories without
fear of litigation. Courts should move away from assuming that any
contact between the intimate worker and consumer amounts to
contexts in which retaliation may occur, Title VII’s antiretaliation provision is simply not reducible
to a comprehensive set of clear rules”).
338. Id. at 174.
339. See supra Part I.B.
340. How such losses should be valued is addressed shortly. See infra notes 389–90 and
accompanying text.
341. See supra Parts II.E.2 and II.E.3.
342. See supra notes 250–52 and accompanying text.
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solicitation.343 Rather, courts should engage in a more fact-sensitive
inquiry as to whether such contact was soliciting business or was simply
an attempt to continue the intimate side of the relationship.
In trade secret litigation, courts should take into account the relative
role of intimate worker efforts as compared with employer efforts in
assessing whether customer identity is subject to trade secret protection.
Current law assumes that sufficient employer efforts mean that customer
identity is not readily ascertainable to competitors, and this leads to
employer ownership of the customer identity as a trade secret.344 Instead,
courts should also consider evidence that relationships between
customers and particular intimate workers were integral to developing or
maintaining a customer base. This evidence, although not determinative,
should factor against the finding of a trade secret violation, as it cuts
against employer ownership of the customer relationship, and gives the
intimate worker a greater ownership stake. Any unfairness to the
employer is reduced by the employer’s ability to maintain customer
identity as a trade secret by taking steps to strengthen customers’ bonds
with the firm as opposed to their bonds with particular intimate workers,
by, for example, rotating which workers serve the same customer.

c.

Reversing Recognition

In still other areas of work law, recognizing intimate work requires
reversing current law’s treatment of intimate work as too much like
family intimacy. In such cases, current law’s subtraction of protection
for intimate work requires instead an addition of protection to ensure that
workers and consumers can enjoy the value of intimate work without
excessive vulnerability.
For example, in response to intimate workers’ tendency to sacrifice
for consumers by doing additional work for them, the FLSA currently
removes wage and hour protection when workers act out of love and
devotion.345 To recognize intimate work and provide adequate protection
here does not require a new test for the meaning of work. Rather, it
requires an understanding that simply because work is done out of love
and devotion for a consumer does not mean that it is not work that is also

343. See supra Part II.E.2.
344. See supra notes 255–56 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing how even intimate workers covered
under the FLSA may be denied payment for portions of their work that are seen to be done out of
love).
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done “primarily for the benefit of the employer.”346 Workers can work
out of multiple motivations. Just as such mixed motives do not take nonintimate work outside the realm of work when one motive is to benefit
the employer, so too should such mixed motives not render intimate
work outside the FLSA’s protection. Work that provides some benefit to
the worker based on her devotion to her consumer does not mean that the
primary benefit of the work does not go to the employer.347 Juries should
be so instructed in such cases when deciding where to draw the line
between work and non-work, with an emphasis on weighing the relative
benefit to employer or employee of the contested intimate work tasks.
This would allow for case-by-case line-drawing between paid work and
non-paid intimacy rather than a categorical rejection of work that is
motivated out of love.

d.

Principles

One of the first considerations with separating out a subset of
workers—intimate workers—who are treated differently under work law
is how to identify the subset of workers who merit this treatment. As
discussed at the outset of the Article, the distinction between intimate
work and other work is not so much binary as a question of degree.348
The law’s project would be identifying when work was sufficiently
intimate to warrant distinct treatment. Line-drawing along a continuous
rather than discrete input is endemic to law. Simply because linedrawing is difficult does not mean it is not a project worth
undertaking.349
Courts should engage in a context-dependent inquiry to assess
whether a worker qualifies for recognition as an intimate worker. Indeed,
this is precisely what the Supreme Court suggested, at least in theory,
when it recognized that an employer’s action against a “close friend”
could constitute an act of retaliation worthy of protection under Title VII
if the facts so warranted (i.e., that the act in retaliation against the “close
friend” would have dissuaded the employee from complaining in light of
346. Holzapfel v. Newburgh, 145 F.3d 516, 528 (2d Cir. 1998).
347. For example, simply because a nurse gains satisfaction from forgoing her lunch break to
provide additional care and support to one of her patients does not negate the fact that the primary
benefit of her work accrues to the employer.
348. See supra Part I.A.
349. For attempts to get purchase on various aspects of the line-drawing problem, see, for
example, Bradley T. Borden, Quantitative Model for Measuring Line-Drawing Inequity, 98 IOWA L.
REV. 971 (2013); David A. Weisbach, Line-Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in Tax Law, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 1627 (1999).
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the relationship).350 And courts have likewise been able to draw such
lines when assessing fiduciary obligations that are based on the facts of
particular relationships.351 The burden would be on the employee to
assert and prove her interest as an intimate worker, although some
intimate workers might categorically be recognized as intimate, at least
for certain purposes, as doctors and lawyers are for non-compete
agreements.
This proof structure is important because of the heterogeneity in how
intimate workers and consumers treat their relationships across different
types of intimate work and even within a particular type of intimate
work. In light of professional training, licensing, and ethics, we might be
willing to make certain presumptions about the doctor-patient
relationship that we are not willing to make about the hairstylistcustomer relationship. But the latter should still support a case for
recognition if it can be proven to warrant it. This variation means that
not all intimate workers need to be treated the same, either across the
category of intimate work, or within a particular type of intimate work.
That is, the law of intimate work might not treat all hairstylists the same
for all purposes, as some develop quite intimate relationships with
consumers, and others do not. Functional recognition of intimate work
thus requires that categorical rules about intimacy and work do not bar
intimate work relationships from protection when the facts merit it.
Beyond this, decisionmakers must engage in a fact-sensitive inquiry to
assess whether protection is warranted.
As for assigning value to ruptured intimate work bonds, money is a
poor substitute for the loss suffered, particularly when the loss is
relational.352 But it is usually the best we can do, as we can see in many
areas where the law awards damages for non-pecuniary losses. This area
of intimate work could then borrow from other areas of law, such as the
cause of action for loss of consortium, that engage in the difficult
problem of how to monetize the loss of relational value, both in quantity
and quality.353 The continuous rather than discrete nature of money
damages is consistent with, and indeed helps to recognize, the fact that
intimate work exists along a spectrum of intimacy. Money damages can
350. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 174 (2011).
351. See supra Part II.C.1.
352. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Dual Lives of Rights; The Rhetoric and Practice of Rights
in America, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 317 (2010).
353. See Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1710 (2007)
(“[J]uries do assign values to even the most inchoate injuries, such as emotional distress and loss of
consortium.”).
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be calibrated to reflect the level of intimacy of the work relationship,
which will typically bear a substantial relationship to the significance of
the loss.
Critics may object that monetizing the value of intimate work
commodifies it and lessens its value by crowding out the intrinsic
motivations of intimacy—altruism and love—that make intimate work
so valuable.354 When subjects are asked to do a task that offers some
intrinsic interests for many people, they are often less willing to perform
the task when they are offered an extrinsic reward.355 Extrinsic rewards
may, under certain circumstances, thus crowd out intrinsic
motivations.356 This might suggest that compensating more of intimate
work (and monetizing the value of lost intimate work relationships)
would lessen intrinsic motivations for intimate work.357
A deeper dive into the research indicates that the concern about
crowding out is unwarranted because it is unlikely to arise, or at least is
avoidable, in the circumstances of intimate work. First, crowding out is
more likely to occur when work is entirely unpaid, and the extrinsic
reward leads the efforts to cross over the unpaid-paid divide.358 Intimate
workers, by definition, are already paid for some of their work. Second,
crowding out occurs when the extrinsic rewards are viewed as
“controlling”—those coupled with close supervision or judgments by
supervisors that may call the worker’s competence into question.359 But
extrinsic rewards that are viewed as “acknowledging”—those that
convey that pay is combined with trust, respect, and appreciation—do
not have such an effect.360 So long as compensation for intimate work is
provided in an acknowledging rather than a controlling fashion, there is
little reason to be concerned about crowding out.

2.

Additional Recognition

Much of the protection required to remedy the vulnerability of
intimate work can be achieved simply by taking a more functional

354. England, supra note 165, at 394 (defining intrinsic motivation as “willingness to expend
effort on a task without extrinsic reward”).
355. See Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURVS. 589
(2001).
356. See id.
357. England, supra note 165, at 394.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 395.
360. Id.
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approach to intimate work under current work law. But the full measure
of protection required for intimate workers and their consumers can only
be achieved by the more robust approach of adding law that would
protect against the promotion of discriminatory intimate work
preferences, the sacrifices taken by intimate workers, the exposure of
intimate workers, and the lost value of intimate work relationships.
These are discussed in turn below.

a.

Discrimination

Recognizing the role that the employer plays in the relationship
between intimate worker and consumer and recent changes in intimacy
law that undermine this field of intimate work law, I join other scholars
in advocating for the elimination of the BFOQ, at least in the context of
same-sex preferences on the basis of privacy.361 But I do not focus on
this doctrinal change here, as the exception encompasses only a small
subset of body workers.362 Rather, my emphasis is on placing more
responsibility on employers to avoid promoting discriminatory
preferences in the intimate work relationship.
A first proposal would prohibit employers from fulfilling express
requests by consumers for intimate workers of a particular protected
trait. Current law already bans employers from “classify[ing]”
employees on the basis of a protected trait, so long as the employee can
show that it “deprive[s] or tend[s] to deprive [him] of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect[s] his status as an
employee”363 Fulfilling express protected-identity-based requests
undoubtedly requires employers to “classify” employees. The challenge
is that such “classif[ication]” may lead to negative employment
consequences down the line that are traceable to the classification but are
361. See Deborah A. Calloway, Equal Employment and Third Party Privacy Interests: An
Analytical Framework for Reconciling Competing Rights, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 327 (1985)
(arguing for the demise of the BFOQ based in customer privacy concerns because it contradicts the
goal of Title VII to promote equal employment opportunity and change the status quo with regard to
identity-based exclusions from employment); Kapczynski, supra note 123, at 1261–62 (arguing for
the demise of the BFOQ based in customer privacy concerns because such concerns cannot be
meaningfully distinguished from other customer preferences that the law does not tolerate).
362. See Yuracko, supra note 9, at 155–57 (discussing the range of cases in which the privacybased BFOQ has been applied).
363. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . . to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.” (emphases added)).
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nonetheless difficult to prove as such. Even though the fulfillment of
such requests may not be neatly linked to a particular adverse
employment action against an employee, this practice perpetuates and
reinforces customer preferences. The change proposed here would make
fulfilling such requests unlawful, even when the employee has difficulty
drawing a connection to a specific adverse consequence.364
One could imagine extending this proposal to a duty on the part of the
employer not to act on more subtle discriminatory preferences (e.g., to
ensure that a request to avoid a particular nurse is not race-based). Such
an affirmative duty that essentially amounts to a negligence-like standard
would be out of place in an employment discrimination law largely
focused on discriminatory intent.365 In the context of sexual harassment,
scholars have acknowledged how employers’ obligations to address
third-party harassment looks far more like a negligence standard than
one based on discriminatory intent.366 However, this obligation applies
only when “the employer had actual or constructive notice of both the
harassment and its basis in race or sex.”367 By analogy, liability in the
context of employers acting on discriminatory consumer preferences
would require the same type of notice on the part of the employer, which
would typically be unavailable. Employers are far less likely to be on
notice of subtle discriminatory preferences, which are based in the
consumer’s state of mind, as compared with the overt acts that make up
harassing conduct.368 Further combatting discriminatory consumer
preferences thus requires resort to other mechanisms.
Employers should be held responsible for the affirmative acts they
take that cultivate and reinforce discriminatory preferences. Such acts
include employers advertising their intimate workers on the basis of
membership in a protected class (e.g., a gynecology practice advertising
364. This type of per se rule may be more properly enforced by the EEOC rather than through a
private suit by an employee, as there would be a question about identifying the injured employee
with standing to sue. Of course, a broad notion of injury could recognize that mere classification by
a protected identity trait, even without a concrete material harm, reinforces stereotyping and stigma
in a way that harms any employees subject to the classification.
365. See Noah A. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the
Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1359, 1364 (2009) (setting forth the
few negligence-like elements in the largely intent-based employment antidiscrimination law).
366. Id. at 1359–61 (explaining how employers have an obligation to prevent intentional
discrimination by third parties, including customers, in the context of sexual harassment, even when
the employers themselves harbor no discriminatory intent).
367. Id. at 1403 (collecting cases).
368. Cf. Julie C. Suk, Procedural Path Dependence: Discrimination and the Civil-Criminal
Divide, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1315, 1361–62 (2008) (describing the “identifiable” and tort-like
conduct of sexual harassment as compared with other employment discrimination claims).
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all women doctors and nurses);369 otherwise making salient to consumers
an intimate worker’s membership in a protected class (e.g., a spa asking
customers for sex preference for a massage therapist); or suggesting
membership in a protected class as a basis for disfavored consumer and
intimate worker treatment (e.g., a statement on a wedding
photographer’s website that the firm opposes same-sex marriage).370
Several mechanisms could lead employers to take responsibility for
such acts. Antidiscrimination law could ban these acts, or could apply a
rebuttable presumption of discrimination to employers who engage in
these acts, even if intimate workers who want to challenge them cannot
draw a direct link between these acts and an adverse employment action.
These proposals might raise First Amendment concerns, although similar
concerns have been put aside in the name of equality.371 Another avenue
to pursue is simply to rely on current law, under which such acts already
serve as evidence of discrimination when an intimate worker experiences
an adverse employment action, such as a failure to hire.372 But
enforcement problems in raising and proving hiring discrimination
claims keep the existing law banning hiring discrimination from being an
effective mechanism.373
One response then is to rely on the EEOC rather than private plaintiffs
to bring these lawsuits. The EEOC already has such authority and would

369. If the firm only employs workers from this protected class (e.g., a gynecology practice with
only female doctors and nurses), such advertising would not even require the employer to engage in
unlawful classification. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012); see also supra note 362 and
accompanying text.
370. See supra Part II.B.1.
371. For example, an employer may not post a sign that reads “White Only,” despite the fact that
this is a restriction on speech. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 13 (1993). The
interaction of antidiscrimination law, particularly sexual harassment, and the First Amendment, has
spawned a large literature. For an introduction, see, for example, id.; Deborah Epstein, Can a
“Dumb Ass Woman” Achieve Equality in the Workplace? Running the Gauntlet of Hostile
Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. L.J. 399 (1996); Cynthia Estlund, Freedom of Speech in
the Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687 (1997);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog That
Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace
Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992).
372. See EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, PRE-EMPLOYMENT INQUIRIES CONCERNING A JOB
APPLICANT’S RACE, COLOR, RELIGION, OR NATIONAL ORIGIN (1982), available at
http://uwf.edu/svodanov/legal/EEOC-AB-inquires.pdf (“[I]nquiries which tend directly or indirectly
to disclose [information about an applicant’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin] . . . . may,
unless otherwise explained, constitute evidence of discrimination prohibited by Title VII.”). Under
some state laws, the inquiries themselves are prohibited. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE
§ 49.60.180(4) (2014); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-12-140 (2015).
373. See Schoenbaum, supra note 149, at 140.
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simply need to make combatting intimate work discrimination an
enforcement priority.374 Of course, the EEOC’s resources are limited,
and expending more resources on hiring discrimination would mean
expending fewer resources on other priorities. Scholars have critiqued
the shift in focus of Title VII litigation from removing identity-based
barriers to employment to protecting those already employed.375 This
scholarship would likewise support prioritizing hiring discrimination at
the EEOC, and, in particular, employer practices that tend to exclude
workers from a field of work on the basis of a protected identity trait, as
we have seen in the context of intimate work.
While these proposals limit consumers from exercising discriminatory
preferences, this should not be considered a flaw. When consumers’
preferences would clearly result in an adverse employment action, the
law does not consider the failure to satisfy these preferences a
cognizable harm to either the consumer or the employer.376 It should be
no different when the connection to an adverse employment action is
less clear. Moreover, in the longer run, challenging intimate biases can
benefit not only workers and society, but those with biases themselves,
who are no longer artificially restricted in their ability to connect with
the full range of intimate workers.
To the extent critics would be concerned that a consumer might
forego important medical or other services rather than interact with an
intimate worker of an undesired identity, these proposals maintain space
for a consumer with fixed preferences to exercise them. It will simply
take more work for her to do so: She will need to do some additional
investigation into the identity of a particular intimate worker before
engaging her services, or she will have to couch a request for a particular
intimate worker in nondiscriminatory terms. The changes proposed
above thus allow antidiscrimination law to aim toward reducing
customer biases while nonetheless recognizing the reality of intransigent
preferences in the short and even long term.
374. It has already done so on occasion. See, e.g., EEOC v. HI 40 Corp., 953 F. Supp. 301 (W.D.
Mo. 1996) (successfully challenging female-only hiring policy for weight-loss counselors); EEOC
v. Sedita, 816 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (successfully challenging female-only hiring policy for
employees at women’s health club).
375. See John Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 984 (1991); Michael Selmi, Public v. Private
Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1458
(1998).
376. See Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a company that
restricted the job of international marketing director to men based on customer preference had
engaged in unlawful discrimination).
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Sacrifice

To protect intimate workers fully, the FLSA should be amended to
extend to intimate work that is currently exempt from its reach on the
basis of intimacy. The recent reforms that would expand wage and hour
protections for home healthcare workers still exempt certain intimate
work—“fellowship” and “protection.”377 The law could require payment
for all of this intimate work, as even fellowship and protection can be
considered work, even if it is also intimate. While some have expressed
concerns about the burden of costs to the consumers (or whoever pays)
in this line of work,378 it is difficult to see why any group of workers
should not be guaranteed the same basic protections as other workers
based on cost concerns, which can be addressed through other means.379

c.

Exposure

A more generous application of fiduciary duties in intimate work
relationships where confidences are shared can serve to protect intimate
workers and consumers against certain forms of exposure. But it still
leaves intimate workers open to hostile or demeaning treatment by
consumers.380 To protect against this type of exposure, intimate workers
could be provided a right to ask, meaning “a right to ask for [particular]
working conditions” as a way to avoid harmful exposure that can be a
part of intimate work.381 For example, a right to ask would allow
intimate workers to seek reprieve from working with an abusive
consumer.
In the United Kingdom, workers have such a right to request
accommodations in the form of modified work hours or work location to
care for a child.382 The law does not require that the employer provide an
377. 29 C.F.R. § 552.6 (2014).
378. See Press Release, Rep. John Kline & Rep. Tim Wahlberg, Kline, Walberg Statement on
DOL
Companion
Care
Regulation
(Sept.
17,
2013),
available
at
http://walberg.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=349958 (“Today’s regulatory
action by the Department of Labor will raise costs and limit access to in-home care for vulnerable
Americans.”); Steven Greenhouse, U.S. to Include Home Health Aides in Wage and Overtime Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2013, at B1 (quoting industry officials raising concerns about costs).
379. For example, the government could subsidize consumers upon proof of need or give a tax
credit.
380. This is far less true for consumers, who typically have more market power to exit than
intimate workers who need their jobs.
381. See Schoenbaum, supra note 149, at 141–44, for a discussion of employing the right to ask
in a different context.
382. See Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 80F (U.K.) (as amended by the Employment Act
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accommodation, but instead requires that the employer consider requests
for accommodation and provide a process for considering such
requests.383 Scholars have commented on how a procedural guarantee
like the one offered under U.K. law frequently results in an employer
accommodating the request.384 “By establishing an institutionalized
forum for employers and workers to discuss potential workplace
changes,” right-to-ask laws can “provide[] a means for employers to
discover that there often are no significant financial, administrative, or
practical downsides to modifying workplace practices as workers
desire.”385
A right to ask (along with protection from retaliation for exercising
the right) could buttress intimate worker voice. Providing a formal legal
mechanism rather than requiring the worker to strike out on her own not
only lowers the cost of making requests, but legitimates the requests.386
Right-to-ask laws can also create a focal point for both employers and
employees to bargain around subjects that are otherwise quite difficult to
bargain around.387 Moreover, an intimate worker’s request for changed
conditions sends a credible signal of the worker’s unhappiness and her
possibility of exit.388 And a right to ask would largely be self-regulating.
As most workers do not want to be perceived as “problems,” they will
tend to ask for an accommodation of this sort only when it is really
needed.
2002).
383. See id.; Julie C. Suk, From Antidiscrimination to Equality: Stereotypes and the Life Cycle in
the United States and Europe, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 75 (2012); Katherine Van Wezel Stone et
al., Employment Protection for Atypical Workers: Proceedings of the 2006 Annual Meeting,
Association of American Law Schools Section on Labor Relations and Employment Law, 10 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 233, 266–68 (2006). Regulations that implement the U.K. law require that
some form of discourse take place: “the holding of a meeting between the employer and the
employee to discuss an application . . . within twenty-eight days after the date the application is
made.” Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 80G(2)(a).
384. See Van Wezel Stone et al., supra note 383, at 268.
385. Id.
386. See Nicholas Pedriana, From Protective to Equal Treatment: Legal Framing Processes and
Transformation of the Women’s Movement in the 1960s, 111 AM. J. SOC. 1718, 1722–23 (2006)
(discussing the legitimating effects of a behavior when it is legalized).
387. For a discussion of the role of focal points in addressing coordination problems, see
generally Richard McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000).
388. See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61
STAN. L. REV. 573, 589 (2008) (“A standard insight of the signaling theory literature in economics
is that as a general matter, a statement is credible when it is accompanied by a costly action—in
particular, an action that is more costly for a dishonest speaker to engage in.”); Caryl E. Rusbult et
al., Impact of Exchange Variables on Exit, Voice, Loyalty and Neglect: An Integrative Model of
Responses to Declining Job Satisfaction, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 599, 605 (1988).
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Of course, the right to ask is no panacea. Beyond not guaranteeing
any substantive outcome, it places the onus of seeking protection on
intimate workers themselves, albeit while lowering the burden of doing
so. To lighten the load, the law could switch the default so that the
employer asks the intimate worker periodically whether she would like
an accommodation against working with harmful consumers.

d.

Lost Investments

Unemployment insurance does little to address the lost value of
ruptured intimate work relationships.389 Programs that directly facilitate
the maintenance or development of intimate ties would be valuable to
intimate workers. For example, UI offices could provide opportunities
for the unemployed to network and socialize with prospective
consumers. In fact, simply providing a space where the unemployed can
gather and support each other in their job searches will almost inevitably
result in connecting prospective intimate workers and consumers. And
socializing with others who are looking for work could help to fill the
void of lost intimate work ties.390

CONCLUSION
The law is premised on categories. Courses and casebooks are built on
the assumption that the objects of legal regulation can be neatly divided
by subject matter. This Article highlights how legal categories can
overlook a social reality that transcends these categories, and documents
the harms that can flow as a result. It reveals how the law’s categorical
approach to intimacy and work overlooks the value and vulnerability
produced by a fundamental part of civil society critical not only to a
large set of workers, but also to the public who consumes their services.
This Article calls for a unified law of intimate work that transcends
standard legal categories. Ultimately, if the law can begin to recognize
both intimacy and work wherever it arises, legal categories, and the
harmful barriers they erect, could start to erode. As work law begins to
encompass intimacy, the legal categories of intimacy and work will
389. See supra Part II.E.4.
390. One example of such a program is Platform to Employment, which some states have
administered using federal funds. See Alana Semuels, A Better Way to Help the Long-Term
Unemployed, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/02/
a-better-way-to-help-the-long-term-unemployed/385298/. This program provides a selected group of
unemployed with a job-readiness class, among other benefits. Id. One participant was quoted as
saying that the class “bonded like a family.” Id.
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become less distinct: work law would also come to be intimacy law, and
intimacy law would also come to be work law. A less categorical law
would better reflect and protect the ways that intimacy and work operate
in our lives.

